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Full title: Statement : Joint Notice of Filing Certain Redlines in Connection with August 24, 2021 Omnibus Hearing (related document(s)[3528], [3533]) filed by Richard W. Slack on behalf of Ditech Holding Corporation. (Slack, Richard)

Document posted on Aug 24, 2021 in the bankruptcy, 36 pages and 0 tables.

Bankrupt11 Summary (Automatically Generated)

The Wind Down Estates, along with the last four digits of their federal tax identification number, as applicable, are Ditech Holding Corporation; DF Insurance Agency LLC; Ditech Financial LLC; Green Tree Credit LLC; Green Tree Credit Solutions LLC; Green Tree Insurance Agency of Nevada, Inc.; Green Tree Investment Holdings III LLC; Green Tree Servicing Corp.; Marix Servicing LLC; Walter Management Holding Company LLC; and Walter Reverse Acquisition LLC.Claimant can demonstrate in numerous ways that Ditech Financial is legallyresponsible for the fraudulent misrepresentations made by prior servicersDiTech, including thosemisrepresentations made by Ditech false affidavits that are rife with fraud and also which appearin the various recorded assignments of mortgage.somuch so that it paints a picture that Beekman is a dead beat homeowner who did not pay insteadof one west bank corrective credit bids, nunc pro tunc and forgeries in BOTH Cases to pass on tounscrupulous Ditech so Ditech and its lawyers can change and spin the record over and over untilits so convoluted, Only Bkeekman with first hand Knowledge and boxes of evidence offered in good faith to the larger fraud scheme by ditech and This court over looks all of that, is wrong.Subject to appropriate pleading and proof as to the amount, the Court should awardBeekman, all attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this action, to be paid by Ditech upfront.The Court is Expunging the Claim of Beekman, but Ditech has committed a felony asfar Section 817.535 Unlawful filing of false documents or records against real or personalproperty.— is concerned.

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WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP JENNER & BLOCK LLP 767 Fifth Avenue 919 Third Avenue New York, New York 10153 New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 310-8000 Telephone: (212) 891-1600 Facsimile: (212) 310-8007 Richard Levin Ray C. Schrock, P.C. Richard W. Slack Sunny Singh Attorneys for the Plan Administrator Attorneys for the Consumer Representative UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------- X : In re : Chapter 11 : DITECH HOLDING CORPORATION, et al., : Case No. 19-10412 (JLG) : Debtors.1 : (Jointly Administered) : --------------------------------------------------------------- X JOINT NOTICE OF FILING CERTAIN REDLINES IN CONNECTION WITH AUGUST 24, 2021 OMNIBUS HEARING TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE: 1. The Plan Administrator2 for the Wind Down Estates of Ditech HoldingCorporation (f/k/a Walter Investment Management Corp.) and its debtor affiliates (excluding Reorganized RMS) (collectively, the “Wind Down Estates”) and the Consumer Representative 1 The Wind Down Estates, along with the last four digits of their federal tax identification number, as applicable, are Ditech Holding Corporation; DF Insurance Agency LLC; Ditech Financial LLC; Green Tree Credit LLC; Green Tree Credit Solutions LLC; Green Tree Insurance Agency of Nevada, Inc.; Green Tree Investment Holdings III LLC; Green Tree Servicing Corp.; Marix Servicing LLC; Walter Management Holding Company LLC; and Walter Reverse Acquisition LLC. 2 Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to such terms in the confirmed Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Ditech Holding Corporation and its Affiliated Debtors (the “Plan”) (ECF No. 1326) and the Joint Opposition of Plan Administrator and Consumer Representative to Request For Leave to Amend (the “Joint Opposition”) (ECF No. 3394).

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submit the two attached redlined exhibits pursuant to the Court’s request at the August 24, 2021 Omnibus Hearing in connection with the Court’s consideration of motions made by James Beekman (“Claimant”): o Exhibit A is a redline version of Claimant’s Corrected Supplemental Requestfor Leave to Amend Nunc Pro Tunc to the April 29, 2021 Request for Leave toAmend (ECF No. 3533) (the “Renewed Request to Amend”), filed on July 7,2021, reflecting changes made from the Request for Leave to Amend (ECFNo. 3361) (the “Request to Amend”) filed by Claimant on April 29, 2021. o Exhibit B is a redline version of Claimant’s Renewed Motion for Rehearing(ECF No. 3528) (the “Renewed Motion for Rehearing”) filed on July 7, 2021,reflecting changes made from the Motion for Rehearing (ECF No. 3261)(the “Motion for Rehearing”) filed by Claimant on February 22, 2021. 2. The Request to Amend, Renewed Request to Amend, Motion forRehearing, and Renewed Motion for Rehearing were filed as PDF documents. Therefore, personnel under the supervision of the Plan Administrator’s counsel were required to convert the filings to Word format for purposes of creating the above comparisons. Thus, while the Word versions do not conform to the formatting, including spacing and pagination, of the original documents, they accurately reflect the words used in the original documents and thus accurately reflect the additions and deletions made by Claimant to his recent filings. * * *

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Respectfully submitted, Dated: August 25, 2021 New York, New York /s/ Richard W. Slack WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10153 Telephone: (212) 310-8000 Facsimile: (212) 310-8007 Ray C. Schrock, P.C. Richard W. Slack Sunny Singh David F. Hill, IV Attorneys for Plan Administrator /s/ Richard Levin JENNER & BLOCK LLP 919 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 (212)891-1600 Richard Levin Email: rlevin@jenner.com Attorneys for Consumer Representative

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Exhibit A Redline of Request to Amend and Renewed Request to Amend

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x : Case no. 19-10412 (JLG) : Chapter 11 In re: : : (Jointly Administered) : Ditech Holding Corporation. et al., : : : Debtors. x CLAIMANT’S CORRECTED SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMENDNUNC PRO TUNC TO THE APRIL 29, 2021 REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMENDClaimant, James Beekman, proceeding pro se, seeks leave of Court to amend Claim No. 24909, and in support of his request explains to this Honorable Court that: 1. It is well known that leave to amend is to be freely given where justice mayrequire. 2. This Court has determined that Claimant “fails to state a claim” arising from themisrepresentations detailed in his prior submissions because those misrepresentations occurred“prior to 2013, but Ditech Financial did not begin to service the loan until February, 2016.”(Doc. 3218, p. 14-15). 3. Claimant can demonstrate in numerous ways that Ditech Financial is legallyresponsible for the fraudulent misrepresentations made by prior servicersDiTech, including thosemisrepresentations made by Ditech false affidavits that are rife with fraud and also which appearin the various recorded assignments of mortgage. Those filed by Ditech, and then Ditech filedthose fraudulent instruments in the Florida Official Court Records and those fraudulentinstruments adversely affected Beekman. Those fraudulent filings and misrepresentations give

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Beekman a private right of action for compensatory damages, statutory damages, and, it isbelieved, punitive damages under Florida law - - specifically, Fla. Stat. §817.535(8)(a) and (b). 4. The first reason that Ditech Financial is responsible for the effects of themisrepresentations occurring prior to its appearance as servicer is that it has ratified andapproved the loan records generated by prior servicers, including but not limited to IndymacBank, FSB, Indymac Loan Services, OneWest Bank and Ocwen which contain themisrepresentations. It has made affirmative representations that the records are accurate, therebyassuming the benefit of those records. It is also therefore naturally responsible for any liabilitywhich may arise from those records, including but not limited to instruments DiTech recorded inthe official recordsOFFICIAL COURT RECORDS of Palm Beach County, Florida. 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is part of a state court filing, of which this Courtshould take judicial notice, entitled “Amended Notice of Filing Affidavit of Stewart Derrick inSupport of Renewed Motion for Summary Final Judgment.” Attached to the Notice of Filing isthe referenced affidavit, (hereinafter “the Ditech Affidavit”), and a volume of so-called loanrecords.1 6. Claimant seeks to amend his Claim to “plead factual content that allows the courtto draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” IdeaSteel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310, 324 (2d Cir. 2011), pursuant to Section 817.535(8)(a)and (b) of the Florida Statutes: 1 The Amended Notice filed with the state court is 82-pages long, including the Ditech Affidavitand all attachments. For the sake of efficiency, Exhibit A is comprised of the two-page notice offiling, followed by the six-page affidavit, and the four assignments of mortgage comprisingComposite Exhibit G to the affidavit.

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(8)(a) Any person adversely affected by an instrument2 filed in the official recordwhich contains a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation hasa civil cause of action under this section without regard to whether criminal charges arepursued under subsection (2). A notice of lis pendens in accord with s. 48.23 shall be filed which specifically describes the instrument under challengeand the real or personal property affected by the instrument. (b)Upon a finding that the instrument contains a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulentstatement or representation such that the instrument does not establish a legitimateproperty or lien interest in favor of another person: 1. The court shall determine whetherthe entire instrument or certain parts thereof are null and void ab initio. If the court findsthe instrument void in its entirety, it may order the instrument sealed from the officialrecord and removed from any electronic database used for indexing or locatinginstruments in the official record. The court may also, permanently or for a period oftime, enjoin the defendant who filed the instrument or who directed the filer to file theinstrument from filing or directing a person to file an instrument in the official recordswithout prior review and approval for filing by a circuit or county court judge, providedthat as to third parties who may have given value for an interest described or granted byany instrument filed in violation of the injunction, the instrument shall be deemed validlyfiled and provides constructive notice, notwithstanding any failure to comply with theterms of the injunction. 2. Upon a finding of intent to defraud or harass, the court or juryshall award actual damages and punitive damages, subject to the criteria in s. 768.72, tothe person adversely affected by the instrument. The court may also levy a civil penalty of$2,500 for each instrument determined to be in violation of subsection (2). 3. The court may grant such other relief or remedy that the court determines is just andproper within its sound judicial discretion. 7. In the Ditech Affidavit beginning on the third page of the attached Exhibit A,Ditech “Corp. Litigation Rep.” Stewart Derrick testifies under oath to the true intentions of itspredecessors with regard to the assignments of mortgage. Ditech’s representative, Derrick, actingon behalf of Ditech with Ditech’s full authorization and authority, would only have personalknowledge of the intentions of the companies named in the assignments from secret or2 “Instrument” is defined as “any judgment, mortgage, assignment, pledge, lien,. financingstatement, encumbrance, deed, lease., bill of sale, agreement, mortgage, notice of claim of lien,notice of levy, promissory note, mortgage note, release, partial release or satisfaction of any ofthe foregoing, or any other document that relates to or attempts to restrict the ownership.,transfer, or encumbrance of or claim against real or personal property, or any interest in real orpersonal property.” §817.535(1)[c].

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undisclosed communications with the other persons and companies or if they were all acting infurtherance of an express conspiracy. Either way, construing the inferences in Claimant’s favor,Claimant is able to and has, or will if permitted to amend, set forth a plausible claim that Ditechis liable for the conduct of which Claimant complains. 8. Either way, construing the inferences in Claimant’s favor, Claimant is able to andhas, or will if permitted to amend, set forth a plausible claim that Ditech is liable for the conductof which Claimant complains. Under Federal Rule 15 and Bankruptcy Rule 7015 amendmentsare Favored as a general matter and should liberally permit pro se litigants to amend theirpleadings and Beekman’s claim is NOT futile if he would be allowed to amend and it is a courterror and a manifest of injustice to not allow the pro se claimant to amend his initial firstpleading based on a Scribner’s error when all Claimant needed to do is show that he might havea claim and the Court was supposed to grant the motion to amend. It is unjust and unfair toClaimant to not allow a simple Amendment since the Claimant stated many times at the hearingthat Ditech filed the fraudulent instruments into the official record book in Palm Beach County.. Furthermore the fact that Ditech gave NO ANSWER as to the illegal retractions on theinstruments that Ditech filed to perpetrate the frauds is supporting only Claimant’s argument. Claimant in good faith in accordance with Civil Rule 1.190 Amendments and supplementalpleadings Only asked for his first chance to Amend after unfounded opposition full of lies andcontradictions that it caused, and then became necessary for Claimant to Amend his pro sepleadings to conform to the evidence already submitted to the court and accepted as unrefutedfact by this Honorable court. Claimant is prejudiced by the fact that he never got a chance toprove his claim, which he can easily do in order to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. McCallister Bros., Inc. v. Ocean Marine Indem Co,.742 F. Supp. 70,80(S.D.N.Y 1989), and

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additionally Federal Rule 15 provides that leave to amend the pleadings should be “freely give[n]. . . . when justice so requires” as this case requires, so that Claimant has the just opportunity tohave his claim heard on the merits. 9. In attempting to explain the repugnancies and contradictions between the variousassignments of mortgage recorded against Claimant’s property in the Palm Beach CountyOfficial Records. Ditech effectively concedes that these four assignments contain “mMateriallyfalse, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representations.” See Fla. Stat. §817.535(b). Accordingto the Ditech Affidavit: Although there have been numerous Assignments of Mortgage among the various loan servicersfor this loan [sic], the Assignments of Mortgage did not transfer ownership of the Note andMortgage to anyone but FHLMC. They are primarily utilized to make the loan servicers themortgagee of record in the Public Records so that they receive notices, such as tax delinquencies,and have the authority to act as the mortgagee. The other entities, namely Ocwen Loan Servicing,LLC, Residential Credit Servicing, and Ditech Loan Servicng, LLC, were assigned the Mortgageas servicing agents for the benefit of FHLMC. Nonetheless, the Assignments of Mortgageattached hereto as Composite Exhibit “F”3 did not convey any ownership interest in the Note orany right to enforce it as anything other than FHLMC’s servicing agent. Since this lawsuit wasfiled, the only entity that has or ever owned the Note or had a beneficial interest in enforcing theNote is FHLMC. (Ditech Affidavit, paragraph 8)(emphasis added). 10. Construing the inferences in favor of Claimant, the assignments of mortgagecontain one or more “materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement[s] or representation[s]”: The assignments appear to transfer ownership of the Note and/or Mortgage. 11. The first assignment states that it was prepared by David J. Stern, Esq., who isnationally infamous for generating false, fraudulent and fictitious assignments of mortgage.4 3 This is an error. The assignments of mortgage are actually Composite Exhibit G to the DitechAffidavit. 4 See, e.g., Conlin, Michelle; “The Rise and Fall of a Foreclosure King,” The Associated Press,February 17, 2011, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna41456966.

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12. The second assignment, on its face, represents that it is a transfer, not of any“servicing rights,” but instead, the “full benefit” of the mortgage. It states that “said Assignorhereby grants and conveys unto the said Assignee, the Assignor’s interest under the Mortgage.”The Assignee is Ocwen Loan Servicing. LLC. 13. The third assignment shows, in exchange for “value received,” a transfer of “allbeneficial interest under a certain Mortgage” on Claimant’s property. The Assignor is Ocwenand the Assignee is Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. 14. In the fourth assignment, the “party of the first part” (Assignor)” is ResidentialCredit Solutions, Inc. The “party of the second part”(Assignee) is Ditech Financial, LLC. Thefourth assignment attests that Assignor “does hereby grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer, and setover unto” the Assignee “a certain mortgage,” “to have and to hold the same unto the said partyof the second part, heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns forever.”15. By filing the Ditech Affidavit, and by basing a claim of standing in theforeclosure action upon one or more of these false and fraudulent instruments, which it knows tobe false and fraudulent, Ditech is acting in furtherance of a conspiracy to unlawfully depriveClaimant of his properties by presenting fabricated evidence and recording instruments in theofficial records containing materially false or fictitious representations. Claimant alleges thatother participants in the conspiracy include MERS, FHLMC, IndyMac Bank, FSB; OneWestBnk, FSB, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. 16. The law of conspiracy makes each conspirator liable for the acts of the otherconspirators while acting in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consider, for example, James v. Nationsbank Trust Company (Florida) Nat’l Ass’n, 639 So. 2d 1031 (Fla 5th DCA 1994):

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Appellants acknowledge that Nationsbank did not participate in any activity that resulted in theexecution and delivery of the notes and mortgages described in the pleadings involved in thisappeal. Nevertheless, appellants urge that Nationsbank “knowingly joined the conspiracy” or“knowingly aided and participated in the ... fraud” by purchasing the appellants’ notes andmortgages and thereby providing funds 5that allowed GDC to perpetuate the alleged fraudulentsales scheme upon others. That, appellants argue, is enough to link Nationsbank with GDC’sfraudulent scheme and constitutes an adoption of all previous acts by GDC. Appellees cite a hostof federal criminal cases for this proposition and three Florida cases. These cases support the proposition advanced by the appellants that persons joining a conspiracywith knowledge of its general purpose and scope may be held liable for all activity in furtheranceof the conspiracy which took place before they joined it. 639 So. 2d at 1032 (emphasis added). 17. Paragraph 7 of the Ditech Affidavit further strengthens the plausibility ofClaimant’s assertion that Ditech has adopted the actions of all previous servicers on the subjectloan or loans, wherein the affiant asserts under oath, on behalf of Ditech, that: “I have personal knowledge of Ditech’s boarding process and process of incorporating priorservice [sic] business records. During the servicer transfer, when Ditech obtains the businessrecords from a prior servicer, it is Plaintiff’s standard business procedure to review saiddocuments for accuracyy during as [sic] those documents are relied upon by Ditech. Once thisreview is completed. Ditech incorporates those records into its own business records and saiddocuments are stored in Ditech’s computer system.” (Emphasis added). The Plaintiff in the case is FHLMC; Ditech appears to testify that FHLMC has a standardbusiness practice of reviewing loan records for accuracy. Here again is a badge of fraudemblematic of participation in the conspiracy of which Claimant complains. It is a falsestatement about a material fact under oath, and it concerns the roles, and relationships to thesubject loan, of the various entities. That sort of misrepresentation appears throughout the historyof the administration of Claimant’s loans. No matter who the servicer is, the conduct continues. This nudges Claimant’s contentions above and beyond plausibility into the realm of probability.

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18. Claimant has stated, or will be able to if granted leave to amend, a plausible basisfor the claim that he obtained or was promised a mortgage loan modification, and that suchmodification 6was thereafter wrongfully not recognized by Ditech or any of its predecessors. This is because there has already been a finding by a court of competent jurisdiction that“Beekman was offered a HAMP modification by the Plaintiff’s agent, Indymac MortgageServices,” that Claimant made four required payments, on time, and that he “submitted allrequired documentation and that he was otherwise qualified for HAMP relief.” (Ruling of theFlorida Circuit Court dated October 30, 2013, at paragraph 2). While the decision was reversedon appeal, the trial court’s factual findings were not reversed. They are not binding but they arepersuasive evidence that Claimant’s contentions regarding the loan modification are plausible. 19. Time does not permit a full explanation of the entirety of Claimant’s case. Claimant submits that he has set forth allegations which are sufficient to state a claim, at thisstage, for fraudulent misrepresentation, violations of Fla. Stat. 817.535, and other causes ofaction. In the alternative, Claimant asserts that, if granted leave to amend, he will be able to statesuch a claim. WHEREFORE, Claimant asks that he be granted leave to amend Claim no. 24909 or that, in thealternative, the Court overrule the Ninth Omnibus Objection With Respect to Claims of JamesBeekman. Respectfully submitted the 29this 7th day of April,July 2021.

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Exhibit B Redline of Motion for Rehearing and Renewed Motion for Rehearing

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRIT OF NEW YORK ) CASE NO.19-10412 (JLG) ) Chapter 11 ) ) In re, (Jointly Administered) ) ) ) MOTION FOR REHEARING ) Ditech Holding Corporation, et al., ) ) Hearing: ) ) Date : Debtors, ) ) Time: ) ) Dept: ) ) RENEWED MOTION FOR REHEARING Claimant James Beekman seeks to strike the memorandum for numerous errors and Rehearing ofthe MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING THE NINTH OMNIBUSOBJECTION (NO BASIS CONSUMER CREDITOR CLAIMS) WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMOF JAMES BEEKMAN, pursuant to the applicable Rule of Federal Civil Procedure andBankruptcy. THIS CAUSE previously came before a Florida State Court and is now Before this BankruptcyCourt.

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1. Claimant seeks rehearing based on court error and manifested injustice due to theevidence submitted by the claimant that Ditech filed fraudulent instruments in the OfficialRecords book in Palm Beach County, Florida violating Florida Statute 817.53. TheMemorandum is riddled with errors and is not consistent with the facts based on the evidencesubmitted and accepted by this honorable court, therefore committing theerror in the Memorandum. 1. The Memorandum is riddled with errors and is not consistant with the facts. 2. BeekmanOn July 7, 2021 Claimant Beekman filed his Corrected Supplemental Requestfor Leave to Amend Nunc Pro Tunc to the April 29, 2021 Request For Leave To Amend. Claimant should be allowed to be heard on the merits because he has properly stated a cause ofaction under Florida Statute 817.53 and for fraud. Additionally he did not default on any loansand this was proven at trial on Oct 21 2013. 3. This court took the Banks attorneys spun narrative and used it to create a Memorandumfull of lies and cherry-picked picked bits and pieces to wrongfully support its dismissal favoringand supporting the banks false position that is well known by the courts from prior settlementslike the 25-billion-dollardollar National Mortgage Abuse Settlement. 4. 3. It astonishes the pro se litigant that this court is claiming it holds Beekman claim in thebest light to help his claim succeed but yet removes itself from the unbridled Bias that Beekmanis a Dead Beat homeowner who got what he deserved, as opposed to the truth that These Bankslike Ditech and One west bank /Cit Bank are shell companies full of crooks who use fraud toinjure Beekman and to skirt the system and the courts by their spinning Narritives and creatingfalse records to suit their greedy foreclosure needs . 5. 4. The court Memorandum is wrong and should be stricken because it contains too manyinaccurate statements like Beekman defaulted on Both Loans , No Determination ever was made

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to that ,in Fact the opposite is that one west bank was unjust and wrongfully foreclosed onBeekman without standing and used corrective assignments of bids and Nunc pro tunc Scribner’serrors to steal his business while he paid for the consolidation of his 3 mortgages not 2 likememorandum incorrectly states. 6. 5. Based upon the evidence presented, the Florida Court found that the Claimant, James G. Beekman, was offered a HAMP modification by the Plaintiff’s agent, Indymac MortgageServices, a Division of One West Bank, FSB, requiring three trial period payments of $1,631.00. Defendant tendered four payments toward this modification, and that such payments were timelymade. Defendant submitted all required documentation for a permanent modification of his loan,and that he was otherwise qualified for relief under the Home Affordable Modification Program. Ditech, and Indymac, and One West Bank failed to approve Defendant’s application for apermanent HAMP modification, and that the denial was without justification. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 7. 6. Beekman respectfully requests this Court to take the following Mandatory JudicialNotice(s): WHEREAS: Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,151d 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233. 8. 7. Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants’pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. Brotherhood ofTrainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425 said that Litigants can be assisted by unlicensedlaymen during judicial proceedings. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957), “Following thesimple guide of rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”...

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“The federal rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep bycounsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading isto facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” 8. The court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that all pleadings shall be construed to dosubstantial justice. Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA). It was held that a prose first amended complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer perJustice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section). B. Platsky v. CIA, 953 F.2d 25, 26 28 (2nd Cir. 1991), “Court errs if court dismisses pro se litigant withoutinstruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings.”9. Beekman is proceeding in this matter “pro se”, and asking the court to please accept hisstatement about him having to appear “pro se” before proceeding into evaluation of this motion. because the Scribner error on the REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMMEND filed April 29, 2021,needed to be amended in accordance with Civil Rule of Procedure 1.190 governing amendmentsand supplemental pleadings so that the Claimant could correct the Scribner error prior servicersand properly amend his pleading to conform to the evidence already submitted to this court thatDitech made material misrepresentations and filed instruments into the Official Records book inPalm Beach County, Florida. 10. Pro se litigants’ court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringentstandards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions, itshould do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntaxand sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78

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S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652(1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding pro se petition cannot be held to same standard aspleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). The courterred in its Memorandum because Claimant obviously was not construed liberally because hestated prior servicers and specifically Ditech was included as a servicer that committed fraudupon fraud and was included in the four corners of the Claimant’s pro se pleading because thepro se Claimant expected the court to hold his claim in the most favorable light, including Ditechin the fraud because Ditech committed the fraud based on the evidence Claimant submitted. 11. The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings andpapers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine whatrelief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also, UnitedStates v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has a special obligation to construe prose litigants’ pleadings liberally); Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07(D.N.J. 2000). 12. Beekman has the right to submit pro se motions, even though they may be in artfullydrawn but the court can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d354 (5th Cir. 1998). 13. Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences oftechnical errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996). Moreover, “the court is under a duty to examine the first amended complaint to determineif the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis,526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir.

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1974)). Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion, they would have to apply the standardsof White v. Bloom. 14. In Cersosimo, the Supreme Court stated: “It is our established policy to allow greatlatitude to a litigant who, either by choice or necessity, represents himself in legal proceedings,so far as such. 15. Beekman respectfully requests this Court to take the following Mandatory JudicialNotice(s): WHEREAS: Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233. 12. Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants’pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. Brotherhood ofTrainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425 said that Litigants can be assisted by unlicensedlaymen during judicial proceedings. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957), “Following thesimple guide of rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”... 16. “The federal rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which onemisstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose ofpleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” 17. The court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that all pleadings shall be construed todo substantial justice. Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA). It was held that apro se first amended complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer perJustice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section). B. Platsky v. CIA, 953 F.2d 25, 26 28 (2nd Cir. 1991), “Court errs if court dismisses pro se litigant withoutinstruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings.”

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18. Beekman is proceeding in this matter “pro se”, and asking the court to please accept hisstatement about him having to appear “pro se” before proceeding into evaluation of this motion. 19. Pro se litigants’ court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringentstandards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions, itshould do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntaxand sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652(1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding pro se petition cannot be held to same standard aspleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). 20. The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings andpapers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine whatrelief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also, UnitedStates v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has a special obligation to construe prose litigants’ pleadings liberally); Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07(D.N.J. 2000). 21. Beekman has the right to submit pro se motions, even though they may be in artfullydrawn but the court can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d354 (5th Cir. 1998).

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22. Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences oftechnical errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996). Moreover, “the court is under a duty to examine the first amended complaint to determineif the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.”Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis,526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)). 23. Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion, they would have to apply the standards ofWhite v. Bloom. 24. In Cersosimo, the Supreme Court stated: “It is our established policy to allow greatlatitude to a litigant who, either by choice or necessity, represents himself in legal proceedings,so far as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party….” (Cersosimo v. Cersosimo, 449 A.2d 1026 (1982)). 25. Beekman respectfully requests this Court to take the following Mandatory JudicialNotice(s): WHEREAS: Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233. 26. Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants’pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. Brotherhood ofTrainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1; v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;Argersinger v. Hamlin, Sheriff 407 U.S. 425 said that Litigants can be assisted by unlicensed

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laymen during judicial proceedings. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 at 48 (1957), “Following thesimple guide of rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”... 27. “The federal rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which onemisstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose ofpleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” 28. The court also cited Rule 8(f) FRCP, which holds that all pleadings shall be construed todo substantial justice. Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA). It was held that apro se first amended complaint requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer perJustice Black in Conley v. Gibson (see case listed above, Pro Se Rights Section). B. Platsky v. CIA, 953 F.2d 25, 26 28 (2nd Cir. 1991), “Court errs if court dismisses pro se litigant withoutinstruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings.”29. Beekman is proceeding in this matter “pro se”, and asking the court to please accept hisstatement about him having to appear “pro se” before proceeding into evaluation of this motion. 30. Pro se litigants’ court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringentstandards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions, itshould do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntaxand sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with rule requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quotingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652

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(1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding pro se petition cannot be held to same standard aspleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). 31. The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings andpapers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine whatrelief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also, UnitedStates v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has a special obligation to construe prose litigants’ pleadings liberally); Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07(D.N.J. 2000). 32. Beekman has the right to submit pro se motions, even though they may be in artfullydrawn but the court can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d354 (5th Cir. 1998). 33. Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences oftechnical errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996). Moreover, “the court is under a duty to examine the first amended complaint to determineif the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.”Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis,526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)).

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34. Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion, they would have to apply the standards ofWhite v. Bloom. 35. In Cersosimo, the Supreme Court stated: “It is our established policy to allow greatlatitude to a litigant who, either by choice or necessity, represents himself in legal proceedings,so far as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party ….” (Cersosimo v. Cersosimo, 449 A.2d 1026 (1982)). 36. latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party ….” (Cersosimo v. Cersosimo, 449 A.2d 1026 (1982)). 37. Beekman should be allowed to Amend his pleadings and asks the Court to allow him toAmend. Beekman has NOT abused the amendment rule and this is his first request for leave toamend the complaint to include the Wind Down Estates and other parties. 38. The issues relating to the HAMP application, expressly raised in Beekman’sArguments. These were the Banks arguments Not Beekman’s because Beekman was wrongfullyin court ERROR and unfairly denied a compulsory counterclaim as a stall Tactic . This courtmemorandum overlooks that fact and Beekman wanted to assert Fraud and Breach of contract forstarters but was Also Not allowed to amend his answer and this court dose not see through theBanks Bologna. Instead what the Banks wanted to argue the payments were tried by the consentof Beekman and the Bank lawyers who made the rules and wrongfully claimed FHLMC hadstanding and Beekman s Loan was Serviced by Ocwen….This court refuses to acknowledgeFHLMC and One West both used Nunc pro tunc and created its standing through abuse of thelitigation priveledgeprivilege which Blank Rome lawyers abuse everyday. And this adverselyaffected Beekman and the Record and this court memorandum did not mention the truth thatOner west Bank assigned its wrongfully forecloseurure bid to Federal Home loan mortgageAssociation, Instead the memorandum skips that important kink in its incorrect memorandum. somuch so that it paints a picture that Beekman is a dead beat homeowner who did not pay insteadof one west bank corrective credit bids, nunc pro tunc and forgeries in BOTH Cases to pass on tounscrupulous Ditech so Ditech and its lawyers can change and spin the record over and over untilits so convoluted, Only Bkeekman with first hand Knowledge and boxes of evidence offered in

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good faith to the larger fraud scheme by ditech and This court over looks all of that, is wrong. Bias and prejudiced Beekman claim and this Memorandum should be strickesstrike as the factsare incorrect and Not truthful…Ditech did commit FRAUD !!! and these violations against thelaw and are felonies being committed by Ditech. 39. Ditech and the other lenders and Servicers such as Ditech failed to approve Beekman fora permanent mortgage modification and this denial was without justification, so found theHonorable Howard Harrison’s. The Judge was reversed on Appeal, but this is what he held butthe case was reversed on other grounds. No one ever Appealed that the Banks were unjust so thatis Unrefuted Fact… 40. Plaintiff’s denial was unjustified and Dietech and Wind Down Estates is therefore liablefor all collateral damages to Beekman including but not limited to missed work, property damages, lost equity, loss of rentalincome, all attorney’s fees, legal fees and legal expenses and personal injury damages. 41. Plaintiff Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation/Indymac Mortgage Services/OneWest Bank was not credible and did not comply with the modification agreement. TheHonorable Judge Howard Harrison said Beekman was credible and believable, and the Plaintiffwas not. The memorandum fails to establish who was at fault. It wrongfully states Beekman defaulted. Itwrongfully states Beekman made 4 payments toward 427 loan, it wrongfully states Beekmanpurchased 2 loans, it wrongfully states Ditech is not a party to the foreclosure case . it wrongfullystates Beekman can’t state a claim against ditech for misrepresentation and Fraud and otherimportant facts and details have been omitted that support Beekman’s claim. ItsIt’s for thisreason memorandum record is not accurate and this court must strike the memorandum asrebutted, One West made super profits from dual tracking and David Sterns was disbarred forforgeries that adversely affected Beekman and Ditech and its agents exploited that causingcompounded insult to injury and this court can’t say Beekman defaulted because no trail wasever conducted that concluded this. ItsIt’s spun to Benefit Ditech and this court should recuseitself from anymore Bankruptcy’s of Large Financial firms if it allows the crooks to steal homes

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and businesses and the file Bk and change its name again and again. ItsIt’s all relevant to thisentirely Bias and errors in the memorandum and it should be stricken and is rebutted. 42. Defendant did comply with the modification Agreement. Beekman did send in thepaperwork and did qualify. (See Exhibit B, page 213 of the Beekman Trial Transcript). 43. The Banks including Dietech fabricated Fake accounting and monthly statements riddledwith fraudulent charges , such as Insurance and late fees and itsit’s because they are making upphony statements that is the misrepresentation and intentional infliction of stress it caused toBeekman for compounding years of suffering after they even admitted $1,469.16 (One ThousandFour Hundred Sixty Nine Dollars And Sixteen Cents) shall be applied to Beekman’s principal, that was not creditedaccording to an Ocwen Representative for Plaintiff due to an error made by Plaintiff. (SeeExhibit C, page 71 of the Trial Transcript). The error in the memorandum states Beekmandefaulted on both loans and this is NOT true and Not Fact and is rebutted because the Banks didnot apply Money and refused Payment because of Better options. This is fact and unrefuted. 44. Compensation is owed for the damages caused to Beekman for the unjustified denial ofthe HAMP Modification Agreement and all expenses caused by this damage. 45. The forfeiture and release of the 425 9th Street property, and the Certificate of Titleshould be reinstated in Beekman’s name .and Beekman’s claims arise from violations of Floridastatue 817.53 and others giving his a cause of action because he was adverslely;y affected by thebank fraud and racketeering scheme to benefit Ditech and the lawyers for the Banks the courtwrongfully and totally overlooksed. The court allowed Ditech to supplement their pleadings,amened their pleadings, and file numerous unfounded objections without merit. It is unjust andprejudices Claimant to not allow him to amend same.

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46. The lenders and servicers including Ditech should be held liable for all court cost, legalfees and legal expenses that were paid to defend the foreclosures and dual tracking by Plaintiff’sagent David J. Stern on the 425 and 427 9th street propertyies. 47. Ditech should provide a full disclosure under penalty of perjury a complete accountingand audit by an independent party of the mortgage loan history including but not limited to allpayments and any payoffs of the loans from any other sources or third parties, such as; insurancecompanies, shared loss agreements from the FDIC, TARP and the original FAS 140, FAS 95GAP Principal pay-offs documents, mortgage satisfaction, title insurance payments, creditdefault swaps, derivatives and 3rd party debt collectors such as Ditech.but and they can’t bandwon’t and this court failed to see the truth and its memorandum is riddled with errors andBeekman can state a claim against wind down estates. 48. Beekman’s is entitled to a Memorandum that is fair, unbiased and is notadjudicated onthe merits instead of a memorandum that is full of mis information like Beekman in 2006purchased 2 properties this is entirely false and it should be stricken as not true, Beekmanrefinanced which was a refi that based on Bank appraisal fraud and predatory per se and thiscourt did not consider the real facts. Additionally, the memorandum should not be based on aScribner’s error made by pro se litigant who obviously included Ditech’s fraudulent filing ofinstruments. 49. The lenders and Ditech should repair Beekman’s credit by way of contacting all creditreporting agencies and correcting and all negative credit reporting by Plaintiff and all it’s agentsand debt collectors concerning all of Beekman’s mortgages, and any derogatory credit reportingagainst Beekman now or in the future. 50. Ditech should produce any and all relevant documents requested by Beekman pertainingto any and all financial transactions that have transpired between the parties from 2004 or at least

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when Ditech began processing the loan through the present and any and all information throughany 3rd party agents that Beekman sees fit. 51. Beekman should be reimbursed for all medical costs from two emergency room visits andhospitalization due to the heart attack he suffered by the long and tedious litigation process toresolve the housing and mortgage issue caused by Ditech and the other lenders. He continues tobe dealing with PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome the Banks has inflicted on him due to thelong and tedious process. 52. Defendant Beekman should be awarded damages in the amount of to be paid to Beekman forall the damages resulting from an unjustified denial of a mortgage modification and byintentionally losing paperwork (See Exhibit D, page 125 of the Court transcript) to add fees andforce a foreclosure and for causing intentional infliction of pain and suffering and loss of worktime, illnesses from stress caused by Ditech’s refusal to come to a reasonable settlementagreement. 52. 53. Subject to appropriate pleading and proof as to the amount, the Court should awardBeekman, all attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this action, to be paid by Ditech upfront. 53. 54. The Bankruptcy Court should retain Jurisdiction to enforce this to determine theamount of attorney’s fees and costs to which Beekman is entitled.

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54. 55. The Court is Expunging the Claim of Beekman, but Ditech has committed a felony asfar Section 817.535 Unlawful filing of false documents or records against real or personalproperty.— is concerned. The most relevant section but not the whole law states: “Title XLVI CRIMES Chapter 817 FRAUDULENT PRACTICES View Entire Chapter 817.535 Unlawful filing of false documents or records against real or personal property.—(1) As used in this section, the term: (a) “File” means to present an instrument for recording in an official record or to cause aninstrument to be presented for recording in an official record. (b) “Filer” means the person who presents an instrument for recording in an official record orcauses an instrument to be presented for recording in an official record. (c) “Instrument” means any judgment, mortgage, assignment, pledge, lien, financingstatement encumbrance, deed, lease, bill of sale, agreement, mortgage, notice of claim of lien,notice of levy, promissory note, mortgage note, release, partial release or satisfaction of any ofthe foregoing, or any other document that relates to or attempts to restrict the ownership, transfer,or encumbrance of or claim against real or personal property, or any interest in real or personalproperty. (d) “Official record” means the series of instruments, regardless of how they are maintained,which a clerk of the circuit court, or any person or entity designated by general law, special law,or county charter, is required or authorized by law to record. The term also includes a series of

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instruments pertaining to the Uniform Commercial Code filed with the Secretary of State or withany entity under contract with the Secretary of State to maintain Uniform Commercial Coderecords and a database of judgment liens maintained by the Secretary of State. (e) “Public officer or employee” means, but is not limited to: 1. A person elected or appointed to a local, state, or federal office, including any personserving on an advisory body, board, commission, committee, council, or authority. 2. An employee of a state, county, municipal, political subdivision, school district,educational institution, or special district agency or entity, including judges, attorneys, lawenforcement officers, deputy clerks of court, and marshals. 3. A state or federal executive, legislative, or judicial officer, employee, or volunteerauthorized to perform actions or services for any state or federal executive, legislative, or judicialoffice, or agency. 4. A person who acts as a general or special magistrate, auditor, arbitrator, umpire, referee,hearing officer, or consultant to any state or local governmental entity. 5. A person who is a candidate for public office or judicial position. (2) (a) A person who files or directs a filer to file, with the intent to defraud or harassanother, any instrument containing a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement orrepresentation that purports to affect an owner’s interest in the property described in theinstrument commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (b) A person who violates paragraph (a) a second or subsequent time commits a felony of thesecond degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.”

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55. 56. Ditech must also comply with the terms of a Consent Order Ocwen entered into withthe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on December 19, 2013, with the State of Florida andapproximately forty eight other states for violation of the states banking and business laws andthe Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. (See Exhibit F)and this memorandum does noteven give hint that Ditech engaged in any violations . 56. 57. Ditech is liable for damages if any violations of the Consent Order occured duringBeekman’s mortgage loan term. Those violations include false statements mailed to attorneyswith falsified accounting that Ditech created during its due course of daily business . SinceDitech Never really serviced beekmans loan due to the Duplicate conflicting assignments thatmake it impossible for ditech to say it serviced any loans in this case. These misrepresentationsand false statements are misrepresentation which are clearly plead as a pro se litigant and thiscourt should stop protecting Ditech and consider the facts as they are Not as ditech’s and Onewest and Fhlmc and Sls Blank Rome liar lawyers spin it . This court should impose Sanctionssufficient to deter a company like One west Bank with 65 Billion in assets and Billionare GeorgeSoros and his gand of crooked banks playing Catch me if you can like Windfall estates, Greentree servicing Ocwen Sls and DITECH and vindicate the judiciary! CONCLUSION 57.57.What is due process in a procedure affecting property interests must be determined bytaking into account the purposes of the procedure and its effect upon the rights asserted and allother circumstances which may render the proceeding appropriate to the nature of the case. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107-108; Ballard v. Hunter, supra, 255; North LaramieLand Co. v. Hoffman, supra, 282-283; Dohany v. Rogers, supra, 369, and cases cited. 57. 58. It is true, of course, that “the fundamental requirement of due process is anopportunity to be heard upon such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the rightfor which the constitutional protection is invoked.” Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.

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S. 233, 246 (1944). Here, Plaintiff’s First Amendment Fundamental Right to Petition theGovernment for the Redress of Grievances is at issue. 58. 59. Beekman’s claim should not be expunged. 59. 60. Leave To Amend should be granted and this Motion For Rehearing should begranted. 60. 61. There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemncontracts, documents, and even judgments.” United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878). Thus, a “fraud on the court” is a fraud designed not simply to cheat an opposing litigant, but to“corrupt the judicial process” or “subvert the integrity of the court.” Oxxford Inc. v. ExpeditorsInt’l, Inc., 127 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1997); Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana, 24F.3d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1994). 61. 62. Fraud on the court is marked by an “unconscionable plan or scheme which isdesigned to improperly influence the court in its decisions,” Dixon v. Commissioner, No. 00-70858, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4831, at *11–12 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003), amending 316 F.3d1041 (9th Cir. 2003), or by “egregious misconduct directed to the court itself.” Greiner v. City ofChamplin, 1523d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

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62. 63. Lawyers are professionally and ethically responsible for accuracy in theirrepresentations to the Court. Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states thatlawyers “shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unlessthere is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faithargument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” Similarly, Rule 3.3provides that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly … make a false statement of fact or law to atribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunalby the lawyer.” Id. at 3.3(a). Here, Ditech’s attorney, knowingly represented to the Bankruptcy Court that he hadconducted an adequate investigation of the Appellant’s foreclosure and prepared Courtdocuments which argued for Expungement. The Court had a right to rely upon hisrepresentations to it, because he was a licensed attorney, and the Court did rely upon them. Butfor the attorney’s unprofessional errors of lying to the Court, a claim upon which relief can begranted was presented, evidenced by the facts. 63. 64. It is clear and well-established law that a void order can be challenged in any court.”Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. V. Mc Donough, 204, U.S. 8 (1907). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff,/Claimant James Beekman, proceeding pro se, hereby prays this Courtwill enter an Order striking the incorrect Memorandum and grant Beekman leave to amend andthen Grant a rehearing on the Claim, or in the lease grant a leave to amend.

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Respectfully submitted, DATED: February _18_July 9, 2021, By: /s/ James Beekman pro se

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Certificate of Service

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I, James Beekman, hereby declare that on July 9, 2021, has served the attached document entitledRENEWED MOTION FOR REHEARING via electronic mail. Sunny Singh @ WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10153 Attorneys for Plan Administrator And Richard Levin @ JENNER & BLOCK LLP 919 Third Avenue New York New York 10022 By: ___/s/ James Beekman_pro se_ 427 9th Street West Palm Beach, FL 33401 561-714-7067 Jbwpb007@gmail.com

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