Full title: Objection by Interested Party Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to 9 Motion for use of cash collateral. Memorandum of law, Proof of service, Proposed order. (Klobucar, Jeffrey) (Entered: 01/30/2021)
Document posted on Jan 29, 2021 in the bankruptcy, 15 pages and 0 tables.
Bankrupt11 Summary (Automatically Generated)
53] wherein the Court authorized the Debtor to use the cash collateral and granted the Prepetition Lenders adequate protection on an interim basis.The proposed order limits the Committee counsel’s fees incident to its review of the Prepetition Lenders’ security interest and limits the ability of Committee counsel to be reimbursed incident to any avoidance action, marshalling claim or any other attempt to obtain a share of the Debtor’s assets for payment to unsecured creditors out of the security interest possessed by the Prepetition Lenders.The proposed order within the Cash Collateral Motion includes within Section 6(d), titled “Mandatory Paydowns of Prepetition Obligations” (emphasis added), “payments to the Prepetition Agent, for the benefit of itself and the other Prepetition Secured Parties, an amount equal to [the Cash Reserve]…” (emphasis added). “The purpose of the exception is to prevent a secured creditor from reaping benefits from collateral that has appreciated in value as a result of the trustee’s/debtor-in-possession’s use of other assets of the estate (which normally would go to general creditors) to cause the appreciated value.”The doctrine of marshalling is especially important here given that the Prepetition Lenders possess other collateral interests that can be used to pay down their debt which may free up Debtor assets to pay the claims of the unsecured creditors.
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Tea Olive I, LLC d/b/a Stock & Field Case No. 21-30037 (WJF)
Debtor. Chapter 11
LIMITED OBJECTION TO DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR ORDER (I) GRANTING EXPEDITED RELIEF AND (II) AUTHORIZING THE USE OF CASH COLLATERAL ON AN INTERIM AND FINAL BASIS AND RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”), by and through undersigned counsel, submits this Limited Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Order (I) Granting Expedited Relief and (II) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral on an Interim and Final Basis (the “Objection”).1 The Committee respectfully represents as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1. The adequate protection replacement liens, the superpriority claim, the numerous and generous waivers, and the prepetition lender expense payments provided for in the Debtor’s Notice of Hearing and Motion for Order (I) Granting Expedited Relief and (II) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral On an Interim and Final Basis [Dkt. No. 9] (the “Cash Collateral Motion”) are gratuitous in the “protections” they provide for Second Avenue Capital Partners, LLC (“Second Avenue” or “Administrative Agent”) as agent for the Prepetition Lenders, and the other Prepetition Lenders (“Prepetition Lenders”) The Cash Collateral Motion and proposed order provide unwarranted protection to the Prepetition Lenders for the Debtor’s use of whatever interest
1 The Debtor has consented to the filing of this Objection by 4:00 pm central time on January 30, 2021.
that the Prepetition Lenders may have in “cash collateral”.
2. On January 10, 2021 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor filed for protection under chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). On January 11, 2021, the Debtor filed the Cash Collateral Motion, seeking interim and final relief giving it authority to use the Cash Collateral (as defined in the Cash Collateral Motion) “to continue the store closing sales in order to maximize the value of its assets for the benefit of the estate and its stakeholders.” Cash Collateral Motion at ¶ 6.
3. The Debtor is in the process of liquidating its assets. It is believed that Debtor’s outstanding unsecured debt may exceed $45,000,000.00.
4. On January 13, the United States Trustee filed an Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Chapter 11 Case [Dkt. No. 37], naming Cam2 International, MWI Veterinary Supply, and Needleart World, LLC as members of the Committee.
5. On January 14, 2021, the Court entered an Interim Order (I) Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral and Affording Adequate Protection; (II) Modifying Automatic Stay; and (III) Scheduling a Final Hearing [Dkt. No. 53] wherein the Court authorized the Debtor to use the cash collateral and granted the Prepetition Lenders adequate protection on an interim basis. The Court also scheduled the final hearing for February 4, 2021.
6. On January 19, 2021, the United States Trustee filed an Amended Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Chapter 11 Case [Dkt. No. 59], adding Under Armour, Inc., STORE Master Funding XV, LLC, Valassis Communications, Inc., and True Media, LLC as members of the Committee.
7. The Committee does not oppose the Debtor’s continuing to use the Cash Collateral and recognizes that entities with an interest in the Cash Collateral must be protected. However,
the proposed adequate protection goes well beyond any Bankruptcy Code required protection and does not provide a fair balancing of the protection that the Prepetition Lenders are entitled to receive and the rights of the other creditors of the Debtor. The proposed order as presently constructed would result in a recovery to the Prepetition Lenders outside of the recovery they would be entitled to receive under the Bankruptcy Code.
8. The Debtor relies on the business judgment rule in order to justify what it claims is fair and necessary in order to effectuate and obtain the Prepetition Lenders’ consent to the use of the Cash Collateral. However, the business judgment rule does not give the Debtor the ability to violate the rights of creditors (other than the Prepetition Lenders) under the Bankruptcy Code.
9. In fact, the Prepetition Lenders already have at least some adequate protection in the form of guarantees from non-debtor guarantors, which would be in addition to the Replacement Liens and Superpriority Claims proposed to be given to the Prepetition Lenders incident to the Debtor’s use of Cash Collateral. Recovery from these non-debtor guarantors would not be affected by these bankruptcy proceedings, leaving the Prepetition Lenders with at least one additional option for recovery—an option the other creditors do not have.
10. On information and belief, Worldwide Distributors (“Worldwide”) was permitted an encumbrance on the Debtor’s assets, which would prime the security interest of the Prepetition Lenders, thereby relegating the Prepetition Lenders to a junior lien position. On February 27, 2019, the Debtor entered into a Security Agreement with Worldwide. However, the UCC Financing Statement authorized by that Security Agreement was not filed until nearly a year later on January 9, 2020, two months prior to the UCC in favor of the Prepetition Lenders, which was filed on March 4, 2020. The fact that the Worldwide UCC was not filed for nearly a year after the Security Agreement was originally executed raises issues with respect to the Worldwide
encumbrance and warrants investigation by the Committee. In the event that the Worldwide encumbrance is voided, that value of the Worldwide lien would be preserved for the benefit of the estate, and provide a significant source of recovery for the Debtor’s unsecured creditors.
11. The proposed order limits the Committee counsel’s fees incident to its review of the Prepetition Lenders’ security interest and limits the ability of Committee counsel to be reimbursed incident to any avoidance action, marshalling claim or any other attempt to obtain a share of the Debtor’s assets for payment to unsecured creditors out of the security interest possessed by the Prepetition Lenders. The Committee has no issue with a cumulative budgeted amount but does believe that the Committee and its counsel are the ones who should dictate how the Committee and its counsel can best discharge their fiduciary duty to other creditors with the funds available for their use. The issue is not the amount available but rather the Prepetition Lenders’ dictating the use of the funds. Counsel for the Committee recognizes that it can only be compensated for work that is beneficial to the estate and cannot be compensated for quixotic quests.
12. The ability of a secured creditor to recover its legal fees and costs is governed by 11 USC § 506(b). At this point in the case it is unknown whether the Prepetition Lenders are over-secured and entitled to recover their costs and legal fees or under-secured and not allowed to recover their costs and fees. Any payment to the Prepetition Lenders should be subject to application at a later point in the case. The payment to the Prepetition Lenders is not the issue but rather the objection is the allocation of payments to items such as legal fees and a so-called Administrative Fee that cannot be recovered or charged if the Prepetition Lenders are under-secured. The application of payments does not need to be decided in a Cash Collateral Order.
13. Section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code disallows payment of claims for post-petition interest and legal fees of under-secured creditors.”[T]he general rule in bankruptcy is that to avoid unfairness between competing creditors and further administrative convenience in paying allowed claims and liquidating the estate, interest on the debt stops at the filing of the petition and any unmatured interest does not become part of the claim.” In re Kellar, 125 B.R. 716, 720 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1989). While the Bankruptcy Code allows for payment of interest in the case of an over-secured creditor, it is not yet established that the Prepetition Lenders are indeed over-secured.
14. The proposed order within the Cash Collateral Motion includes within Section 6(d), titled “Mandatory Paydowns of Prepetition Obligations” (emphasis added), “payments to the Prepetition Agent, for the benefit of itself and the other Prepetition Secured Parties, an amount equal to [the Cash Reserve]…” (emphasis added). As stated above, the Committee believes that the security interest in favor of the Prepetition Lenders may be secondary to any interest held by Worldwide. As such any payment should be subject to a cash reserve in favor of Worldwide (or the estate if the Worldwide lien is voided) and any payment for the benefit of the Prepetition Lenders subject to application at a later date.
15. The additional adequate protection in the form of periodic payments to the Prepetition Lenders is proposed without any guardrails. The Committee does not oppose the proposed sweep of the Debtor’s available cash accounts to pay down the principal owed on the Prepetition Lenders’ Claim however the Debtor is getting nothing for allowing the sweep. The Prepetition Lenders have not waived the ability to receive default interest and there is no assurance that, if the Worldwide lien is avoided, the Debtor will have at its disposal ready cash equal to the avoided Worldwide lien. A specific reserve of $3,000,000.00 should be set aside to provide protection to both the Debtor and Worldwide.
16. The Cash Collateral Order should also require that the Committee be furnished copies of all reports provided to the Prepetition Lenders.
17. The proposed terms in the Cash Collateral Motion also give unfettered discretion to the Administrative Agent (acting for the benefit of the Prepetition Lenders) on whether to authorize “Non-Conforming Use” expenses. It does not make sense to allow the Administrative Agent—again, acting for the benefit of the Prepetition Lenders and essentially in control of all of the Debtor’s cash accounts—to have unfettered and unsupervised discretion on how to use the Debtor’s cash (which could be ultimately be used for unsecured creditor payments). Rather, it makes better sense to limit any Non-Conforming Use to solely those expenses that are authorized by the Court.
18. The Debtor has waived various equitable remedies that it may assert against the Prepetition Lenders. The proposed order appears to go on to try to preserve the right to assert equitable remedies to other parties in interest. The preservation may prove to be illusory if in fact the waiver is binding on a subsequent Trustee. The better means of handling this issue is to have the Debtor covenant that it will not pursue such an action and grant immediate authority to the Committee to pursue such actions within a reasonable period of time.
19. In addition to waiving the right to demand marshalling, the Debtor also proposes to waive all rights under 506(c) and 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. This means the estate could potentially be paying for benefit that would only inure to the benefit of the Administrative Agent and the Prepetition Lenders. By waiving all “equities of the case” arguments under section 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor foregoes any possibility of retaining additional value derived from the collateral of the Prepetition Lenders before anyone (other than the Prepetition Lenders themselves) can do an examination of the Prepetition Lenders’ alleged liens and the extent to which
they may or may not cover assets of the estate. The single driving principal throughout the Bankruptcy Code is equity among creditors such that no single creditor or class of creditors receives an undeserved windfall at the expense of other creditors who could have otherwise recovered at least some value from the estate. The upfront and unconditional waiver of the equitable (and statutory) rights provided through sections 506(c) and 552(b) upsets this principal before any thorough investigation can be conducted by a party who does not stand to benefit from the waivers
20. The Debtor’s waiver of 506(c) rights, equities of the case exception under 552(b) and marshalling of the Prepetition Lenders’ collateral is harmful to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code of providing equitable distribution to all creditors. The statutory and equitable protections of the estate should not be waived. See In re The Colad Grp., Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 224 (Bankr. W.D.
N.Y. 2005) (“While the debtor may seek authority to waive its own rights, it cannot waive the marshalling rights of parties who have not consented and may not even have received notice of the debtor's motion. Under the present procedural circumstances, this court can discern no basis to eviscerate the equitable doctrine of marshalling.”).
21. Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee to charge the costs of preserving or disposing of a secured lender’s collateral against the collateral itself. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). This statutory provision ensures that the cost of liquidating a secured lender’s collateral is paid by the secured creditor and not paid from unsecured recoveries. See, e.g., Precision Steel Shearing v. Fremont Fin. Corp. (In re Visual Indus., Inc.), 57 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating, “section 506(c) is designed to prevent a windfall to the secured creditor”); Kivitz v. CIT Group/Sales Fin., Inc., 272 B.R. 332, 334 (D. Md. 2000) (stating, “the reason for [section 506(c)] is that unsecured creditors should not be required to bear the cost of protecting property that is not
theirs”); In re The Colad Grp., Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 224 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (denying agreement between debtor and secured creditor to waive section 506(c) surcharge provision).
22. The Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 120 S. Ct. 1942, 147 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2000) held that a debtor or trustee is the only party that can invoke section 506(c); thus, if the Court authorizes the Debtor to waive its section 506(c) rights, they will be gone forever to the detriment of the unsecured creditors. And doing so under these circumstances seems at odds with the independent exercise of the fiduciary duty of the Debtor. “[T]he trustee [DIP] is obliged to seek recovery under [§ 506(c)] whenever his fiduciary duties so require.” Id. at 1950.
23. Moreover, many courts have taken the position that such waivers of 506(c) actions are unenforceable per se. McAlpine v. Comerica Bank-Detroit (In re Brown Brothers, Inc.), 136 B.R. 470, 474 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (“The cash collateral order, which grants to Comerica a postpetition lien on all of the debtor’s assets, attempts to immunize Comerica from surcharge payment obligations under 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). Such a provision is not enforceable in light of the congressional mandate that a trustee have the authority to use a portion of secured collateral for its preservation or proper disposal.”); In re Willingham Investment, Inc., 203 B.R. 75, 79 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1996) (“The cash collateral order . . . contemplates the payment of postpetition operating expenses of the debtor. First Tennessee’s alleged priority position, would, in effect, prohibit the payment of §506(c) expenses and subordinate postpetition creditors’ claims to First Tennessee’s prepetition claim. Such a reading . . . is nonsensical and disingenuous in light of First Tennessee’s consent to the payment of postpetition operating expenses to keep the [debtor’s] doors open for business and the payment of the Trustee’s fees and expenses.”); In re Ridgeline Structures, Inc., 154 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1993) (“the FDIC, in the proposed stipulation
and order, provided for itself that no expense of administration will be charged against the secured party under § 506(c) no matter what action, inaction, or acquiescence by FDIC might occur. That is against public policy and unenforceable per se.”) (emphasis added). See also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Magna Bank, N.A. (In re Hen House Interstate, Inc.), 150 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1998) reh’g granted and opinion vacated on other grounds (Sept. 22, 1998), on reh’g en banc, 177 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 1999). (“Furthermore, we believe that an agreement by a debtor and a secured creditor to prohibit the payment of § 506(c) administrative expenses from the secured creditor’s collateral would operate as a windfall to the secured creditor at the expense of administrative claimants. We therefore conclude that such a provision is unenforceable.”).
24. The waiver of the equities of the case exception under section 552(b) should also be denied. “The purpose of the exception is to prevent a secured creditor from reaping benefits from collateral that has appreciated in value as a result of the trustee’s/debtor-in-possession’s use of other assets of the estate (which normally would go to general creditors) to cause the appreciated value.” In re Muma Servs., 322 B.R. 541, 558-559 (Bankr. D. Del. 200) (quoting Delbridge v.
Prod. Credit Ass’n, 104 B.R. 824, 826 (E.D.Mich. 1989)). At this early point in the case, it is too early to know what expenses will be expended in the liquidation sales at the Debtor’s stores and what benefit the proceeds from those sales will bring to the Prepetition Lenders. Because it is too early to know the extent of any benefits, it is likewise too early to waive the exception.
25. Marshalling of assets is an equitable doctrine based on “the principle that a creditor having two funds to satisfy his debt may not, by his application of them to his demand, defeat another creditor, who may resort to only one of the funds.” Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233, 236 (1963) (quoting Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449, 456–57 (1925)). Under the doctrine of marshalling of assets, the court can direct that collateral be liquidated in an order which
protects unsecured creditors. In re Hale, 141 B.R. 225, 227 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992) (“While the marshalling theory was originally designed to protect junior lienholders, it should not be applied to ignore unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.” (citing 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 67.24 (14th ed.
1978).)). See also In re Jack Green's Fashions for Men--Big & Tall, Inc., 597 F.2d 130 (8th Cir.
1979) (requiring marshalling so as to prevent the bank from exhausting business assets when mortgaged real estate was also available) and In re Bame, 279 B.R. 833, 837 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002) (“The doctrine of marshalling is designed to promote fair dealing and justice and is applied when it can be equitably fashioned as to all parties.”).
26. The doctrine of marshalling is especially important here given that the Prepetition Lenders possess other collateral interests that can be used to pay down their debt which may free up Debtor assets to pay the claims of the unsecured creditors. Again, given the early status of this case, it is inappropriate to prematurely dismiss an equitable doctrine before it is known whether it is appropriate to do so. The Committee is willing to live by a specific date whereby it must assert a marshalling claim against the Debtor or file an action wherein it seeks to void some or all of the lien on Debtor assets asserted by the Prepetition Lenders.
27. Another problem with the proposed order is the $25,000 cap within the money allocated to the Committee for professional services for doing its statutory duty (i.e. investigating the claims possessed by the Debtor against the Prepetition Lenders). Section 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code grants the Committee the ability to perform any service that is in the interest of the unsecured creditors. The Committee has no objection to the Order setting a date by which the Committee must challenge the liens of both Worldwide and the Prepetition Lenders. In fact counsel for the Prepetition Lenders has reached out to Committee counsel and provided copies of the Prepetition Lenders’ documentation and perfection. The Committee can move quickly to
determine if the liens of the Prepetition Lenders and Worldwide are voidable under applicable law.
In its effort to reduce costs, the Committee has, at this point, decided it does not need the services of a Financial Advisor. A portion of the funds set aside for the Committee professionals has been reduced in the budget.
28. Removing the $25,000 cap for investigative work done by the Committee would not leave the Prepetition Lenders without the ability to object to any fees incurred by the Committee in that all administrative expense claims sought by the Committee would still need to be approved by this Court at which point the Prepetition Lenders would be free to object to any unreasonable fees and those which proved to be of no benefit to the estate. While the Committee is willing to work within the budget approved by the Prepetition Lenders for Committee professionals, it is unwilling to have the Prepetition Lenders dictate the legal work that is performed within the budgeted amount.
29. As pointed out in the Cash Collateral Motion, the Debtor and the Prepetition Lenders negotiated out the terms of the adequate protection to be given to the Prepetition Lenders in exchange for use of the Cash Collateral without any input from any other creditors who might be disadvantaged by such terms. Bankruptcy is intended to protect the interests of all creditors, not just the largest secured creditor, such as the Prepetition Lenders, and postpetition use of cash collateral should not be approved when it will skew a case solely in favor of the secured creditor. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that a debtor’s business judgment does not allow a creditor to leverage the bankruptcy process and powers or its purpose to benefit a “party-in-interest” over the estate).
A. The Prepetition Lenders’ Superpriority Claim Must be Subordinate to Paid Administrative Claims.
30. The Cash Collateral Motion proposes to grant to the Prepetition Lenders, in addition to the Replacement Liens, an Adequate Protection Superpriority Claim. The Debtor and the Prepetition Lenders propose to make this Superpriority Claim subordinate only to the Carveout.
However, it does not limit the ability of the Prepetition Lenders to claw back payments made during the case. The superpriority should not include payments previously made during the case or those that have been approved in the budget up through the date the use of Cash Collateral is terminated. There is no reason to place payments previously made by the Debtor post-petition at risk of being clawed back.
B. Budget Compliance Reports Should Go to the Committee and the Court.
31. While the proposed order requires the Debtor to file Budget Compliance Reports to the Administrative Agent every week showing it is spending the Cash Collateral in substantial compliance with the budget, the Administrative Agent is looking after the interest of the Prepetition Lenders and not the estate. As such, the Budget Compliance Reports should be submitted to the Committee and the Court in addition to the Administrative Agent.
C. All Non-Conforming Use Payments Must be Subject to Court Approval.
32. The proposed order gives the Administrative Agent sole and exclusive authority to approve or block any payments that do not conform to the proposed budget. While the Committee does not object to those payments being subject to the approval of the Administrative Agent, the Administrative Agent should not have sole authority. At the very least, any Non-Conforming Use payments must be limited only to payments made in the ordinary course of the Debtor’s business—in this case, the liquidation sales, insurance payments, employee payments, etc. Preferably, these payments should require Court approval.
D. Any Modification to the Automatic Stay Must be Properly Noticed For Hearing and Cannot Receive Expedited Relief Ahead of Time Nor Can It be Automatically Granted Preemptively.
33. The proposed terms in the Cash Collateral Motion allow the Debtor expedited hearing in seven days after the Debtor provides an “Enforcement Notice” following the Termination Date (as defined in the Cash Collateral Motion). Local Rule 9006-1(e) requires a party requesting expedited relief to expressly do so in the motion seeking relief.
34. The Cash Collateral Motion also proposes to allow an automatic lifting of the stay, effectively removing the reins from the Court’s hands and allowing the Prepetition Lenders to do as they please with the Debtor’s assets without any oversight or even notice to other parties. This completely defeats the entire purpose of the automatic stay, which is to ensure that the Debtor’s assets are properly maintained and equitably distributed under the Bankruptcy Code. “The automatic stay is a basic protection afforded debtors under the bankruptcy laws and its scope is intended to be broad.” In re Taylor, 190 B.R. 459, 460 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).
35. The Committee objects to the certain provisions of the Cash Collateral Motion as outlined above and requests that the Court approve the Cash Collateral Motion only with the revisions as requested herein and for such other relief as is just and equitable.
A Professional Association
Dated: January 30, 2021 By: /e/ Jeffrey D. Klobucar
Jeffrey D. Klobucar (#0389368)
100 South Fifth Street, Suite 1500
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Telephone: (612) 333-3000
Facsimile: (612) 333-8829
Douglas S. Draper, LA Bar # 5073 (admitted pro hac vice)
Leslie A. Collins, LA Bar # 14891 (admitted pro hac vice)
Greta M. Brouphy, LA Bar # 26216 (admitted pro hac vice)
HELLER, DRAPER & HORN, L.L.C.
650 Poydras Street, Suite 2500
New Orleans, LA 70130
Telephone: (504) 299-3300
Facsimile: (504) 299-3399
Proposed Counsel for the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
In re: Bankruptcy Case No. 21-30037 (WJF)
Tea Olive I, LLC d/b/a Stock+Field, Chapter 11 Case
DECLARATION FOR PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Jeffrey D. Klobucar, an attorney licensed to practice law in this Court, with an office address of 100 South Fifth Street, Suite 1500, Minneapolis, MN 55402, declare that on January 30, 2021, I caused the following documents:
Limited Objection to Debtor’s Motion for Order (I) Granting Expedited Relief and (II) Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral on an Interim and Final Basis, and
Declaration for Proof of Service,
to be served and filed electronically with the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court through ECF, and that the Bankruptcy Court, via ECF, will send an electronic notice of the filing to all parties registered to receive electronic service, which includes the parties required to receive service under Local Rule 9013-3(b) and as set forth by the Court’s Order [ECF #53].
And I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: January 30, 2021 By: /e/ Jeffrey D. Klobucar
Jeffrey D. Klobucar (MN #0389368)