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Full title: Motion for Relief from Stay . Fee Amount $188. Filed by Joseph M. Bruno Sr of Bruno & Bruno on behalf of Angela Dolce (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A # 2 Exhibit B # 3 Exhibit C # 4 Exhibit D # 5 Exhibit E) (Bruno, Joseph) (Entered: 04/15/2021)

Document posted on Apr 14, 2021 in the bankruptcy, 18 pages and 0 tables.

Bankrupt11 Summary (Automatically Generated)

Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce allege in the First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages that Shaw maintained a policy of liability insurance with Omaha, which said policy covered the negligence of Mr. Dolce’s wrestling coaches, including Mr. Surrency, and specifically covers the damages complained of in the petition, such that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce have a right of direct action against Omaha as liability insurer of Mr. Dolce’s wrestling coaches, including Mr. Surrency, pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1269.During the week of March 22, 2021, counsel for the Debtor contacted Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s counsel and informed counsel for Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce of Debtor’s counsel’s belief that the First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages filed in the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson violated the Automatic Stay in this matter, and Debtor’s plan to file a Motion for Relief for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay if Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce did not dismiss Mr. Surrency and Omaha in the civil litigation. 13. Attempting to again work with Debtor’s counsel, and to ensure that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce were not violating the Automatic Stay in this matter, counsel for Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce asked Debtor’s counsel for information regarding the Omaha insurance policy, indicated that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce would have no problem with dismissing Omaha without prejudice in the event that the insurance policy provided by Omaha was property of the bankruptcy estate, and asked Debtor’s counsel for any legal support which supported Debtor’s position that Mr. Surrency and/or Omaha being named as Defendant(s) in the civil litigation was a violation of the Automatic Stay. If this Honorable Court decides that the stay should not be fully lifted, then Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce respectfully request that the stay be partially lifted to allow for written discovery and depositions of Omaha and Mr. Surrency so that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce can determine whether Omaha’s policy is property of the bankruptcy estate and to determine if Mr. Surrency is covered by any insurance policy that is not property of the bankruptcy estate. 46.Alternatively, if this Honorable Court finds that the Automatic Stay is Applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency and does not find “cause” to terminate the Automatic Stay, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce respectfully request that this Honorable Court issue an Order partially lifting the Automatic Stay to allow for written discovery and depositions of Omaha and Mr. Surrency so that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce can determine whether Omaha’s policy is property of the bankruptcy estate and to determine if Mr. Surrency is covered by any insurance policy that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA IN RE: CASE NO. 20-10846 THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH SECTION: “A” FOR THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW ORLEANS, CHAPTER 11 DEBTOR MOTION TO LIFT STAY A HEARING WILL BE CONDUCTED ON THIS MATTER ON MAY 20, 2021, AT 1:30 P.M., BY TELEPHONE THROUGH THE DIAL-IN FOR SECTION A: 1-888-684-8852; ACCESS CODE: 9318283. IF YOU OBJECT TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN THIS PLEADING, YOU MUST RESPOND IN WRITING. UNLESS DIRECTED OTHERWISE BY THE COURT, YOU MUST FILE YOUR RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT NO LATER THAN SEVEN (7) DAYS BEFORE THE HEARING DATE. YOU MUST SERVE A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE ON THE PERSON WHO SENT YOU THE NOTICE; OTHERWISE, THE COURT MAY TREAT THE PLEADING AS UNOPPOSED AND GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED. NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes Plaintiffs, Angela Dolce (hereinafter “Ms. Dolce”) and Angelo Dolce (hereinafter “Mr. Dolce”), in a lawsuit originally entitled Angela Dolce and Angelo Dolce v. Archbishop Shaw High School, The Roman Catholic Church Archdiocese of New Orleans, Jakob McKee, Pearl River High and The St. Tammany Parish School Board, Case No. 814821, Div. “N”, 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson, who out of an abundance of caution1, respectfully request that this Honorable Court lift the Automatic Stay pursuant to Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. Alternatively, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce respectfully request that this Honorable Court partially lift the stay to allow limited 1 On April 8, 2021, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce filed an Opposition to the Motion for Relief for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay filed by Debtor, The Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans [ECF. Doc. 813], as Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce do not believe that the facts and/or law in this matter support the Debtor’s position that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce violated the Automatic Stay.

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written discovery and/or depositions to determine if Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company’s insurance policy is classified as “property of the estate” and to determine if Brandon Surrency (“Mr. Surrency”) is insured by any insurance policy which is not “property of the estate”. I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1. On February 15, 2020, Mr. Dolce, seventeen and a minor at the time (date of birth January 8, 2003), was a student athlete enrolled in the eleventh grade at Archbishop Shaw High School (hereinafter “Shaw”) who was injured during a semifinal wrestling match in Shreveport, Louisiana for the Louisiana High School Athletic Association Championships. 2. On February 15, 2020 and/or before the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of New Orleans (hereinafter “Debtor”) filed a Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition in the above captioned matter, Shaw and/or the Debtor was/were aware of Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s claim(s). In fact, upon information and belief, Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company (hereinafter “Omaha”) paid some of Mr. Dolce’s medical bills resulting from Mr. Dolce’s wrestling match injuries (Please see Explanation of Benefits, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”). 3. The Debtor herein filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on May 1, 2020. Despite being a known creditor, notice that Debtor filed for bankruptcy was not provided to Ms. Dolce and/or Mr. Dolce. In fact, Ms. Dolce and/or Mr. Dolce did not learn and/or know that the Debtor filed for bankruptcy until February 26, 2021 (Please see February 26, 2021 correspondence sent from Debtor’s counsel to Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s counsel, attached hereto as Exhibit “B”). 4. On October 1, 2020, this Honorable Court issued an Order Fixing Time For Filing Proof of Claims; Approving Proof of Claim Forms; Providing For Confidentiality Protocols; And Approving Form And Manner Of Notice [ECF Doc. 461]. This Order, among other things, ordered

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that the General Claims Bar Date be November 30, 2020, 5:00 p.m. (Central Time). Despite being a known creditor, notice of this Order was not provided to Ms. Dolce and/or Mr. Dolce. In fact, Ms. Dolce and/or Mr. Dolce did not learn and/or know about this Order until their counsel investigated this matter after receiving the February 26, 2021 correspondence referenced above. In addition, the November 30th deadline was before Mr. Dolce reached the age of majority. 5. On February 12, 2021, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce filed a Petition for Damages in a lawsuit originally entitled Angela Dolce and Angelo Dolce v. Archbishop Shaw High School, The Roman Catholic Church Archdiocese of New Orleans, Jakob McKee, Pearl River High and The St. Tammany Parish School Board, Case No. 814821, Div. “N”, 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson (Please see Petition for Damages, attached hereto as Exhibit “C”). 6. During the weeks of March 1, 2021 and March 8, 2021, Debtor’s counsel and counsel for Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce had conversations regarding the bankruptcy, Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s claim(s), Debtor’s counsel’s belief that the lawsuit filed in the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson violated the Automatic Stay in this matter, and Debtor’s plan to file a Motion for Relief for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay if Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce did not dismiss Shaw and the Debtor in the civil litigation. 7. To avoid the possibility of being found in violation of the Automatic Stay by this Honorable Court and/or having this Honorable Court order sanctions against Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce agreed to dismiss Shaw and Debtor from the civil lawsuit without prejudice. 8. On March 12, 2021, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce filed a Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice and Incorporated Memorandum in Support. On March 15, 2021, an Order was signed by the Honorable Steven D. Enright, Jr. of the 24th Judicial District Court which ordered, among

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other things, that Shaw and Debtor be dismissed without prejudice (Please see Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice and Incorporated Memorandum in Support and signed Order, attached hereto as Exhibit “D”). 9. On March 17, 2021, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce filed a First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages naming Mr. Surrency, Mr. Dolce’s wrestling coach at Shaw, and Omaha, an insurer believed to have made payments for Mr. Dolce’s medical bills resulting from his wrestling match injuries (Please see First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages, attached hereto as Exhibit “E”). 10. Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce allege in the First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages that Mr. Dolce’s wrestling coaches, including Mr. Surrency, were negligent in: A. Failing to provide a safe environment for their student athlete; B. Acting with indifference towards the safety of their student athlete; C. Inadequate supervision of their student athlete; D. Improperly allowing an inexperienced student athlete to wrestle against an experienced student athlete; E. Improperly allowing an inexperienced injured student athlete to continue to wrestle against an experienced student athlete; F. Inadequate prevention of a preventable and foreseeable incident; G. Failing to properly train their student athlete and/or the wrestling coaches; H. Negligently hiring of wrestling coaches; I. Failing to hire and/or use competent and properly qualified staff; J. Failing to obtain proper and/or timely medical treatment for their injured student athlete; and K. Other acts of negligence which will be shown more fully at trial.

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11. Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce allege in the First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages that Shaw maintained a policy of liability insurance with Omaha, which said policy covered the negligence of Mr. Dolce’s wrestling coaches, including Mr. Surrency, and specifically covers the damages complained of in the petition, such that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce have a right of direct action against Omaha as liability insurer of Mr. Dolce’s wrestling coaches, including Mr. Surrency, pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1269. 12. During the week of March 22, 2021, counsel for the Debtor contacted Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s counsel and informed counsel for Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce of Debtor’s counsel’s belief that the First Amended and Supplemental Petition for Damages filed in the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson violated the Automatic Stay in this matter, and Debtor’s plan to file a Motion for Relief for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay if Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce did not dismiss Mr. Surrency and Omaha in the civil litigation. 13. Attempting to again work with Debtor’s counsel, and to ensure that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce were not violating the Automatic Stay in this matter, counsel for Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce asked Debtor’s counsel for information regarding the Omaha insurance policy, indicated that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce would have no problem with dismissing Omaha without prejudice in the event that the insurance policy provided by Omaha was property of the bankruptcy estate, and asked Debtor’s counsel for any legal support which supported Debtor’s position that Mr. Surrency and/or Omaha being named as Defendant(s) in the civil litigation was a violation of the Automatic Stay. Debtor’s counsel indicated that she could not provide any insurance information, one reason being because of the Automatic Stay, insisted that both Mr. Surrency and Omaha had to be dismissed from the civil litigation, and instead of providing any legal support, on March 25, 2021, filed a Motion for Relief for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay [ECF Doc. 800].

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14. Despite Shaw and the Debtor being dismissed from the civil lawsuit as explained above, and despite providing no support that the insurance policy provided by Omaha is property of the bankruptcy estate, much less any support that Mr. Surrency and/or Omaha being named Defendants in the civil lawsuit is a violation of the Automatic Stay, the Debtor asked this Honorable Court to issue an order: (A) finding that Plaintiffs’ Counsel violated the automatic stay (i) by filing a lawsuit on behalf of their clients, Angela Dolce and Angelo Dolce, against the Archdiocese and Archbishop Shaw during the pendency of the automatic stay, and (ii) by amending their clients’ Petition in an attempt to recover insurance belonging to the Debtor’s estate; (B) ordering Plaintiffs’ Counsel to pay the actual damages sustained by the Debtor; and (C) granting such other and further relief to which the Debtor may be entitled in law and equity. Debtor’s Motion for Relief for Willful Violation of Automatic Stay is set for hearing on April 15, 2021 at 1:30 p.m. II. LAW AND ARGUMENT A. The Automatic Stay is Not Applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency 15. Section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code operates as an automatic stay of, the commencement or continuation…of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this time (emphasis added). 16. Actions against non-debtors are not typically stayed. In Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y. v. JMH 100 Doe, et al. (In re Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y.), 618 B.R. 400, 405 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 07/02/2020) (citations omitted), the court explained: Subdivision (a)(1) of section 362 provides in relevant part that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of ‘the commencement or continuation...of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under [title 11], or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.’

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By its language, subdivision (a) applies only to the debtor and not to any non-filing affiliates…(noting that subdivision (a)(3) is the only likely avenue for application of the automatic stay to affiliated entities) The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit has concluded that section 362 “does not operate as an automatic stay of claims against the co-defendants…” Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F. 2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 17. As this Honorable Court stated at pages five (5) through six (6) of its November 2, 2020 Order and Reasons [ECF Doc. 528] (emphasis added) in the above captioned matter, The automatic stay ‘does not apply to actions against a non-debtor except in situations where assets of the bankruptcy estate would be at risk in allowing a court proceeding to continue against a codefendant.’ In re Xexon Anesthesia of Tex., PLCC, 510 B.R. at 111 (citing Matter of S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d at 1147-50; A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986)). As an example, a bankruptcy court may invoke § 362 to stay proceedings against non-bankrupt codefendants where there is such an identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Mud King Prods., Inc., No. 12-3120, 2013 WL 1948766, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2013) (quoting Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. v. Enron Can. Corp., 349 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). But the mere ‘presence of identical allegations against the debtor and non-debtor defendants are an insufficient ground to extend the stay to the nondebtors.” Id. (quoting Beran v. World Telemetry, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 2d 719, 724 (S.D. Tex. 2010)). ‘There must be an actual, as opposed to an alleged or potential identity of interests, such that a judgment against the nonbankrupt parties would in fact be a judgment against the bankrupt party.’ Id. (quoting Beran, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 724). ‘The burden of proof to show that the [automatic] stay is applicable to a non-debtor is on the party invoking the stay.’ Id. 18. According to the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Sosebee v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 701 F.3d 1012, 1021-1022 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (emphasis added),

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The Louisiana Direct Action Statute explicitly states that when an insured is in bankruptcy, an injured person or his survivors may bring an action directly against the insurer without joining the insured… … The purpose of Louisiana's Direct Action statute is to safeguard the rights of injured persons. The Louisiana direct action statute creates a ‘contractual relationship which inures to the benefit of any and every person who might be negligently injured by the insured as completely as if such injured person had been specifically named in the policy.’ Section 655 of Title 22, Louisiana Revised Statutes, provides in part: A. No policy or contract of liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in this state, unless it contains provisions to the effect that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured shall not release the insurer from the payment of damages for injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the policy ... B. (1) The injured person or his survivors or heirs ... shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy ... however, such action may be brought against the insurer alone only when at least one of the following applies: (a) The insured has been adjudged bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction or when proceedings to adjudge an insured bankrupt have been commenced before a court of competent jurisdiction .... The plain language of the statute evinces Louisiana's intent for the insolvency of the insured not to ‘release the insurer from the payment of damages’ to injured parties. Section 22:1269 is crafted to protect Louisiana's vital interest in liability insurance that covers injuries to people in the state. The Supreme Court held even where an insurance contract expressly prohibited direct actions before a determination of the insured's liability, Louisiana's interest in protecting injured parties under Section 22:1269 overrode Massachusetts's interest in enforcing its contract rules. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that ‘the direct action statute does not create an independent cause of action against the insurer, it merely grants a procedural right of action against the insurer where the plaintiff has a substantive cause of action against the insured.’ Under Section 22:1269, insurers may raise any defenses that arise from the nature of the obligation, that are personal to the insurer, or ‘that are common to all the solidary obligors.’ Insurers may not, however, raise defenses to liability that are personal to the insured, such as the fact the insured is in bankruptcy. Thus, if there is coverage for Sosebee's claim, the fact

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Harvest is in bankruptcy should not affect Steadfast's obligation to pay on the claim… 19. According to the Sosebee Court at 1023 (emphasis added), [w]hen a debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate is created under 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 541(a) (2006). Except as otherwise provided in the statute, the estate includes ‘all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.’ 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). We have held that while insurance policies are generally property of the estate, the proceeds of liability insurance policies, unlike first party policies, generally are not. 20. “[The] definition [of the bankruptcy estate] is intended to be broadly construed, and courts are generally in agreement that an insurance policy will be considered property of the estate. Insurance policies are property of the estate .... Any rights the debtor has against the insurer, whether contractual or otherwise, become property of the estate.” Sosebee at 1023. 21. “Acknowledging that the debtor owns the policy, however, does not end the inquiry. The question is not who owns the policies, but who owns the liability proceeds ....” Id. (emphasis added). 22. “The overriding question when determining whether insurance proceeds are property of the estate is whether the debtor would have a right to receive and keep those proceeds when the insurer paid on a claim ....” Id. (emphasis added). 23. According to the Sosebee Court at 1023 (emphasis added), [e]xamples of insurance policies whose proceeds are property of the estate include casualty, collision, life, and fire insurance policies in which the debtor is a beneficiary. Proceeds of such insurance policies, if made payable to the debtor rather than a third party such as a creditor, are property of the estate and may inure to all bankruptcy creditors. But under the typical liability policy, the debtor will not have a cognizable interest in the proceeds of the policy. Those proceeds will normally be payable only for the benefit of those harmed by the debtor under the terms of the insurance contract.” 24. The Fifth Circuit in Sosebee at 1023-1024 (emphasis added) stated as follows:

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In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 55–56 (5th Cir.1993) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Sfuzzi, Inc.,191 B.R. 664, 666 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1996) (holding liability insurance proceeds not property of bankruptcy estate). Only in the limited instance of a mass tort action where hundreds or thousands of claims against the debtor's insurer might exhaust insurance proceeds and thus threaten the debtor's estate over and above limits of liability insurance policies have courts held the proceeds of liability insurance policies are property of the bankruptcy estate. E.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns–Manville Corp.,837 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir.1988), (‘Manville's insurance policies and their proceeds were substantial property of the Manville estate which will be diminished if and to the extent that third party direct actions against the insurance carriers result in plaintiffs' judgments.’) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Edgeworth, 993 F.2d at 56 n. 21 (‘In the mass tort context, the decisions by several courts to include the proceeds as property of the estate appear to be motivated by a concern that the court would not otherwise be able to prevent a free-for-all against the insurer outside the bankruptcy proceeding.’) At the time Harvest filed for bankruptcy, all of the twenty largest unsecured claims against Harvest were for ‘Vendor/Trade Debt’, not tort liability. Sosebee's personal injury claim against Harvest is the result of an isolated accident to which the mass tort precedents are inapplicable. There is no evidence that numerous tort claims threaten the limits of Harvest's liability insurance or that Steadfast needs to be protected from a siege of tort claims under Harvest's policy. Therefore, the proceeds of the policies at issue in this case are not the property of Harvest's bankruptcy estate. 25. Likewise, the Debtor in this matter provides no support that Omaha’s insurance policy and its proceeds are substantial property of the Debtor’s estate which will be diminished if Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s direct action against Omaha results in judgment against Omaha. Instead, the Debtor indicates that the Omaha insurance policy is a student accident insurance policy and a liability insurance policy. The fact that the policy is a student accident insurance policy, in of itself, should lead this Honorable Court to the determination that it is not property of the bankruptcy estate. As a student accident insurance policy, it is highly unlikely that a sexual abuse claimant and/or a non-student who sustained personal injury during the policy’s terms could even recover against Omaha. Regardless, Debtor fails to provide relevant information regarding this

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insurance policy, including but not limited to the policy limits, whether other claims threaten the limits of Omaha’s policy, and/or whether Omaha needs to be protected from a siege of tort claims. Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce take the position that Mr. Dolce’s personal injury claim is the result of an isolated accident to which any proceeds of the Omaha policy at issue in this case is not the property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate and that sexual abuse claimants and/or non-students who sustained personal injury during the policy’s terms could not recover against Omaha. 26. Without any support that the Omaha insurance policy is property of the bankruptcy estate, Debtor makes an unsupported leap that the policy is property of the bankruptcy estate and then alleges that because the Debtor is threatened with a multitude of tort claims that may exceed the limits of its liability insurance policies, the policy proceeds that Plaintiffs seek to recover should be classified as property of the Debtor’s estate. This position, however, is not supported by the evidence before this Court and/or the law. 27. “Because liability insurance proceeds are generally not property of the bankruptcy estate, if a direct action claimant succeeds in obtaining a judgment against an insurer, the claimant recovers from the insurer directly rather than from the bankruptcy estate.” Sosebee at 1024 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 28. According to the Sosebee Court at 1024, recovery against the Insurers causes a dollar for dollar reduction of any obligation on the part of [the debtor] to repair any damage suffered by the Plaintiffs. In turn, the value of the remaining claims against the assets of [the debtor] increases by the amount of the diminished liability of [the debtor]. Recovery against the Insurers lessens the sum total of claims for which the estate is or may be liable, while at the same time potentially increases the pro rata recovery of creditors that are situated, as a matter of priority, the same as the Plaintiffs' claims (or that are situated in a position of lesser priority), but are not afforded by applicable non-bankruptcy law the right to liability insurance coverage.

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29. “The automatic stay does not generally apply to third parties such as debtors' codefendants or guarantors…” Sosebee at 1025 (citations omitted). 30. “Where a court finds insurance proceeds to be property of the bankruptcy estate the automatic stay will apply to direct actions against insurers, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), but where the proceeds of the insurance policies are not property of the bankruptcy estate, direct actions against insurers will not be affected by the stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.” Sosebee at 1025. 31. In S.I. Acquisition, Inc., v. Eastway Delivery Services, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1987), the Court had the following issue for its review: “What is the scope of the automatic stay provided for in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362?” The Court ultimately decided on three “guiding principles”: (1) a section 362(a)(3) stay applies to a cause of action that under state (or federal) law belongs to the debtor; (2) a section 362(a)(3) stay applies to a cause of action that seeks to recover property of the estate where the property is held or controlled by a person or entity other than the debtor; and (3) in applying the above rules we do so by keeping in mind the Bankruptcy Code's general policies of securing and preserving the debtor's property and of ensuring equal distribution of the debtor's assets to similarly-situated creditors. S.I. Acquisition, Inc. at 1150. As clearly seen in this Motion, none of the three “guiding principles” apply to Mr. Surrency and/or Omaha. First, the cause of action against Mr. Surrency and Omaha belong to Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce, not the Debtor. Second, Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s claims seek to recover property from Mr. Surrency and Omaha, not the Debtor. The Debtor would not even be a party in the civil litigation. Third, there will not be any threat to the unequal distribution of the Debtor’s assets because the Debtor will not be a party to the prosecution of claims against Mr. Surrency and Omaha, and Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce are attempting to collect against the insurer not from the

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bankruptcy estate. As stated above, as a student accident insurance policy, it is highly unlikely that a sexual abuse claimant and/or a non-student who sustained personal injury during the policy’s terms could even recover against Omaha. Based on the above law and the evidence before this Honorable Court, the Debtor’s assets are not implicated or at risk to creditors. B. If this Honorable Court finds that the Automatic Stay is Applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency, the Automatic Stay Should Be Lifted 32. An automatic stay is not absolute. In the event this Honorable Court finds that the automatic stay is applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce respectfully request that this Honorable Court find that “cause” exists to terminate the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(d)(1) and the factors commonly considered by Bankruptcy Courts. 33. According to the Court in In re Fowler, 259 B.R. 856, 868 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001), some bankruptcy courts consider factors such as (a) whether the bankruptcy case was filed as a litigation tactic; (b) whether the case has a connection with or interferes with the bankruptcy case; (c) whether the bankruptcy estate is prejudiced by the stay being lifted; and (d) whether the creditor seeking to lift the stay intends to recover from non-estate property, such as insurance proceeds. 34. According to the Court in In re Robertson, 244 B.R. 880, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000), courts have adopted a three-prong test for determining whether cause exists to lift a stay on pending litigation. Those factors are: 1. whether any great prejudice to either the bankruptcy estate or the debtor will result from prosecution of the lawsuit; 2. whether the hardship to the non-debtor party by continuation of the automatic stay considerably outweighs the hardship to the debtor; and 3. whether the creditor has a probability of success on the merits of his case. 35. According to the Court in In re Xenon Anesthesia of Texas, Inc., 510 B.R. 106, 112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014),

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Section 362(d)(1) provides for lifting of stay for cause. The term ‘cause’ used in 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) is not defined in the Code and whether cause exists must be determined on a case by case basis. Allowing a matter to proceed in another forum may constitute cause. In re Murray Industries, Inc., 121 B.R. 635 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1990). The Bankruptcy Code gives the court broad discretion to provide appropriate relief from the automatic stay as may fit the facts of a particular case. In re Atlantic Ambulance Associates, Inc., 166 B.R. 613 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1994). 36. The Court in In re Xenon Anesthesia of Texas, Inc., 510 B.R. 106, 112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014) stated, In determining whether to lift the automatic stay to allow litigation against a debtor to proceed in another forum, bankruptcy courts have considered the following factors: 1) whether the relief will result in a partial or complete resolution of the issues; 2) lack of any connection with or interference with the bankruptcy case; 3) whether the other proceeding involves Debtor as a fiduciary; 4) whether a specialized tribunal has been established to hear the particular cause of action; 5) whether the debtor's insurer has assumed full responsibility; 6) whether the action primarily involves third parties; 7) whether litigation in the other forum would prejudice the interests of other creditors; 8) whether the judgment claim arising from the other action is subject to equitable subordination; 9) whether movant's success would result in a judicial lien avoidable by the debtor; 10) interests of judicial economy and the expeditious and economical resolution of litigation; 11) whether the proceedings have progressed to the point that parties are ready for trial; and 12) impact of the stay on the parties and the balance of harm. See In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795 (Bankr.D.Utah 1984); Sonnax Industries, Inc., 907 F.2d 1280 (2nd Cir.1990); In re United States Brass Corp., 176 B.R. 11, 13 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1994); In re Fowler, 259 B.R. 856 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2001). 37. “Not all factors may be relevant to each case. Further, the decision to lift the stay may be upheld on judicial economy grounds alone.” In re Xenon Anesthesia of Texas, Inc., 510 B.R. 106, 112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014) citing In re United States Brass Corp., 176 B.R. 11, 13 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1994), citing In re Kemble, 776 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir.1985). 38. In the case before this Honorable Court, several of the above factors weigh in favor of lifting the stay. Moreover, and alternatively, the stay can be lifted in such a way that this Court can ensure that there is no risk to the bankruptcy estate.

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39. Ms. Dolce’s and Mr. Dolce’s case is a personal injury non-core proceeding. It is not against the Debtor but instead is against Jakob McKee, Pearl River High, The St. Tammany Parish School Board, Mr. Surrency, and Omaha. The case’s relation to the bankruptcy is minimal at best. Moreover, the main issue in the case – whether Mr. Surrency and/or other Defendants are liable to Ms. Dolce and/or Mr. Dolce for damages related to a personal injury – cannot be decided by this Court as this Court is without the authority or jurisdiction to establish liability in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), (b)(5). The case was filed in the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson which Court is available to determine liability in this case, issues of Louisiana state law, and has the expertise to adjudicate this case and its issues. These factors weigh in favor of lifting the stay. 40. The Court in In re Honosky, 6 B.R. 667, 669 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1980), discussing the lifting or modification of an automatic stay, stated, “[l]ack of adequate protection and lack of equity are not the sole grounds for relief from the stay.... Where the claim is one covered by insurance or indemnity, continuation of the (civil) action should be permitted since hardship to the debtor is likely to be outweighed by hardship to the plaintiff. (2 Collier on Bankruptcy s 362.07(3) at 362-49 (15th ed. 1979)).” 41. Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce should not have to wait years to litigate liability in this matter, especially given the fact that the Debtor indicates that the Omaha insurance policy is a student accident insurance policy and a liability insurance policy. As a student accident insurance policy, it is highly unlikely that a sexual abuse claimant and/or a non-student who sustained personal injury during the policy’s terms could even recover against Omaha. Additionally, the Debtor’s estate will not be depleted, and other creditors will not be prejudiced. As a result, this case can proceed without risk to other creditors. Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce take the position that Mr. Dolce’s personal injury claim is the result of an isolated accident to which any proceeds of the

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Omaha policy at issue in this case is not the property of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate and that sexual abuse claimants and/or non-students who sustained personal injury during the policy’s terms could not recover against Omaha. 42. The lifting of the automatic stay does not interfere with the administration of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate or have an impact on any property of the estate. It also does not result in prejudice to the Debtor or the estate. 43. Overall, these many factors weigh in favor of lifting the stay in this case. Alternatively, however, it is possible for this Court to fashion its order lifting the stay such that only certain issues can be tried in another forum. This Honorable Court can lift the stay in such a way that the trial on the merits of this case can proceed without any risk to the bankruptcy court. 44. The Eastern District of Louisiana in In re Wallace, Rush, Schmidt, Inc., 2018 WL 3954184, *1 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2018), a case in which the debtor had several state tort claims against it, stated that the Court’s “general practice in these types of cases” was to lift the stay “to allow litigation to proceed to judgment in state court, with the claimants then directed to return to this court in the even they were successful in obtaining a judgment against the debtor.” C. Alternatively, if this Honorable Court finds that the Automatic Stay is Applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency, the Automatic Stay Should Be Partially Lifted to Allow for Written Discovery and Depositions of Omaha and Mr. Surrency 45. If this Honorable Court decides that the stay should not be fully lifted, then Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce respectfully request that the stay be partially lifted to allow for written discovery and depositions of Omaha and Mr. Surrency so that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce can determine whether Omaha’s policy is property of the bankruptcy estate and to determine if Mr. Surrency is covered by any insurance policy that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

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46. For the reasons previously stated, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce will be gravely prejudiced in this litigation and personally if this limited discovery is not allowed to proceed. “The Bankruptcy Code gives the court broad discretion to provide appropriate relief from the automatic stay as may fit the facts of a particular case.” In re Xenon Anesthesia of Texas, Inc., 510 B.R. 106, 112 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014) citing In re Atlantic Ambulance Associates, Inc., 166 B.R. 613 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1994). 47. “On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay…” 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d). III. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Automatic Stay in this matter is not applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency. However, if this Honorable Court finds that the Automatic Stay is Applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce respectfully request that this Honorable Court find that “cause” exists to terminate the Automatic Stay pursuant to § 362(d)(1) and the factors considered by Bankruptcy Courts, and that this Honorable Court issued an order lifting the Automatic Stay and allowing the movants’ state court action to proceed against Omaha and Mr. Surrency. Alternatively, if this Honorable Court finds that the Automatic Stay is Applicable to Omaha and/or Mr. Surrency and does not find “cause” to terminate the Automatic Stay, Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce respectfully request that this Honorable Court issue an Order partially lifting the Automatic Stay to allow for written discovery and depositions of Omaha and Mr. Surrency so that Ms. Dolce and Mr. Dolce can determine whether Omaha’s policy is property of the bankruptcy estate and to determine if Mr. Surrency is covered by any insurance policy that is not property of the bankruptcy estate.

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Respectfully submitted, BRUNO AND BRUNO, LLP /s/ Joseph M. Bruno Joseph M. Bruno, No. 3604 Donald D. Reichert, Jr., No. 33328 Bruno & Bruno, LLP 855 Baronne Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70113 Telephone: (504) 525-1335 Fax: (504) 561-6775 Attorneys for Angela Dolce and Angelo Dolce CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Motion is being served on April 15, 2021 (a) by electronic case filing for those parties receiving notice via the Court’s Electronic Case Filing system, (b) by email on Attorneys R. Patrick Vance (pvance@joneswalker.com), Elizabeth J. Futrell (efutrell@joneswalker.com), Edward D. Wegmann (dwegmann@joneswalker.com), Mark A. Mintz (mmintz@joneswalker.com), Laura F. Ashley (lashley@jonewalker.com), and Samantha Oppenheim (soppenheim@joneswalker.com), to be sent by Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc. (“DRC”), and (c) by email or First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on all other partis requiring service under the Court’s Ex Parte Order Authorizing the Debtor to Limit Notice and Establishing Notice Procedures [ECF No. 22], to be sent by DRC. DRC shall file a certificate of service to that effect once service is completed. /s/ Donald D. Reichert, Jr. Donald D. Reichert, Jr.

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