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Full title: Opposition to (related document(s): 437 Motion to Reconsider (related documents 392 Order on Application to Employ (BNC-PDF)) Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates APC as Special Litigation Counsel filed by Interested Party Erika Girardi) Filed by Special Counsel Ronald Richards (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Ronald Richards # 2 Affidavit Erin Joyce # 3 Affidavit Bjorn Wallman # 4 Proof of Service) (Richards, Ronald) (Entered: 07/16/2021)

Document posted on Jul 15, 2021 in the bankruptcy, 21 pages and 0 tables.

Bankrupt11 Summary (Automatically Generated)

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Erika Girardi’s reconsideration motion is a thinly-veiled attempt to derail Speci 3 Litigation Counsel’s investigation of Ms. Girardi, among other potential targets, in tracin4 the theft of funds from the debtor’s estate.A, p. 6), Ms. Girardi is asking this Court to (1) silence Mr. Richard11 prospectively by issuing a gag order and (2) to punish Mr. Richards by removing him fro12 this case for exercising his free speech rights in twitting about this case in the past.But even if Ms. Girardi could theoretically establish the inevitability of an unfair tria12 she has failed to show that alternatives to a wholesale gag order would be insufficien13 Notwithstanding her request for a blanket ban against any form of speech over such 14 matter of intense public interest – based on the false premise that fair trials and fre15 speech by lawyers are mutually exclusive – less restrictive alternatives to content-base16 suppression of truthful speech protect litigants from unfair trials.While Ms. Girardi claims that she did not hav25 the information forming the basis of her new motion when she opposed the trustee’26 request to appoint Mr. Richards, this assertion is factually flawed.Ms. Girardi also argues that reconsideration is justified because Mr. Richards wa8 required to notify the Court that he was interviewed in connection with an AB9 documentary “about Girardi Keese, Mr. Girardi and Ms. Girardi, which also feature10 petitioning creditor Kimberly Archie.”

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Document Contents

robert.cooper@wilsonelser.com 2 WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER LLP 3 555 S. Flower Street, 29th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 4 Tel: (213) 443-5100 Fax: (213) 443-5101 5 Attorneys for Court-Appointed 6 Special Litigation Counsel Law Offices of Ronald Richards 7 & Associates, APC 8 Ronald Richards (SBN: 176246) 9 ron@ronaldrichards.com Morani Stelmach (SBN: 296670) 10 morani@ronaldrichards.com LAW OFFICES OF RONALD RICHARDS 11 & ASSOCIATES, APC P.O. Box 11480 12 Beverly Hills, California 90213 Tel: 310.556.1001 13 Fax: 310.277.3325 14 Special Litigation Counsel for Elissa D. Miller, Chapter 7 Trustee 15 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 16 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 17 LOS ANGELES DIVISIONn re Case No. 2:20-bk-21022-BR 18 GIRARDI KEESE, Chapter 7 19 Debtor. SPECIAL LITIGATION COUNSEL’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF ERIKA 20 GIRARDI TO RECONSIDER CHAPTER TRUSTEE'S APPLICATION TO EMPLO 21 THE LAW OFFICES OF RONALD RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES, A.P.C. 22 Date: TBD 23 Time: TBD Ctrm.: TBD 24 [Filed Concurrently with Declarations of 25 Ronald Richards, Erin Joyce and Bjorn Wallman and Evidentiary Objections] 26 27 28

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2 Pag 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 4 LEGAL DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................... 5 I. Ms. Girardi Lacks Standing to Seek the Relief She Is Requesting ............. 6 II. Alternatively, Ms. Girardi’s Reconsideration Motion Should Be 7 Denied Because It Is Based on the False Premise That Mr. Richards Should Be Bound by a Gag Order .............................................. 8 A. The requested gag order would be unconstitutional ........................ 9 B. The case law invoked by Ms. Girardi does not apply here ............ 110 III. Ms. Girardi’s Motion Is Procedurally Flawed ............................................ 111 A. The applicable standards .............................................................. 112 13 B. The motion violates the governing standards ................................ 114 C. The statutory provisions invoked by Ms. Girardi do not apply here ............................................................................................... 115 D. Mr. Richards was not required to discuss an un-aired 16 television interview in his prior disclosures .................................... 117 E. The uncontroverted evidence shows there is no conflict ............... 118 F. The court should consider the broader picture in evaluating 19 Ms. Girardi’s true motive in filing this motion ................................. 220 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 221 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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2 Page( 3 Cases 4 Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886 (1st Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................... 1 5 Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 6 852 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988) ......................................................................................... 1 7 Carroll v. Nakatani, 8 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................... 1 9 ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Bowers, 643 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 110 Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 11 312 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................. 112 Connors v. United States, 13 158 U.S. 408 (1895) ..................................................................................................... 14 Crowell v. Campbell Soup Co., 264 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................... 115 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 16 (2008) 554 U.S. 471 ................................................................................................... 117 Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 18 331 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................... 119 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) ........................................................................................... 10, 120 HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 21 675 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................... 122 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 23 556 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................... 124 Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 84 Cal.App.4th 1232 (2000) ......................................................................................... 25 In re Black and White Cab Co., Inc., 26 175 B.R. 24 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994) .......................................................................... 127 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Goodman), 28 33 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................... 2

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245 Cal.App.4th 847 (2016) ......................................................................................... 2 In re Michaelson, 3 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1975) ...................................................................................... 2 4 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ................................................................................................... 15 6 In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983) ...................................................................................... 2 7 In re Statewide Pools, Inc., 8 79 B.R. 312 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) ......................................................................... 1 9 Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................... 110 11 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ..................................................................................................... 12 M.G. v. St. Lucie County School Bd., 13 741 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................. 114 Martinez v. State of Calif. Dept. of Transp., 238 Cal.App.4th 559 (2015) ....................................................................................... 115 Matter of Fondiller, 16 707 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1983) ............................................................................ 7, 17, 117 Mu’Min v. Virginia, 18 (1991) 500 U.S. 415 (1991) ....................................................................................... 119 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) ................................................................................................. 8, 20 Optyl Eyewear Fashion International v. Style Companies, 21 760 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................... 22 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 23 478 U.S. 1 (1986) ......................................................................................................... 24 Ralls v. U.S., 52 F.3d 223 (9th Cir. 1995) ........................................................................................ 225 Richardson v. Marsh, 26 481 U.S. 200 (1987) ................................................................................................... 127 School Dist. No. 1J v. AC and S, Inc., 28 5 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................ 1

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617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 13, 1 2 Sellers v. Mineta, 3 350 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................... 1 4 Skilling v. U.S., 561 U.S. 358 (2010) ................................................................................................... 15 6 Sorensen v. State Bar, 52 Cal.3d 1036 (1991) ............................................................................................... 1 7 Stroble v. California, 8 343 U.S. 181 (1952) ................................................................................................... 1 9 U.S. v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1995) ...................................................................................... 210 11 Statutes 12 11 U.S.C. 13 § 101 ................................................................................................................... 114 § 101(14) ............................................................................................................ 115 § 327(a) .............................................................................................................. 116 § 327(e) .................................................................................................. 12, 17, 117 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, 18 § 6068(b) ............................................................................................................ 119 § 6068(f) ............................................................................................................. 120 § 6068(g) ............................................................................................................ 121 Other Authorities 22 Jones, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: 23 Federal Civil Trials & Evidence (Rutter Group 2020) ................................................. 124 Tuft, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: 25 Professional Responsibility (Rutter Group 2020) ....................................................... 126 Rules 27 Fed. R. Bank. P. 28 § 2004 ........................................................................................................... 20, 2

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2 § 9024 ................................................................................................................. 1 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 § 59(b) ................................................................................................................ 15 § 59(e) .................................................................................................... 12, 13, 16 § 60(b) .................................................................................................... 12, 14, 17 § 60(b)(1) ............................................................................................................ 18 § 60(b)(2) ............................................................................................................ 19 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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2 Erika Girardi’s reconsideration motion is a thinly-veiled attempt to derail Speci 3 Litigation Counsel’s investigation of Ms. Girardi, among other potential targets, in tracin4 the theft of funds from the debtor’s estate. Ms. Girardi’s motion is dead on arrival becaus5 in addition to fundamental procedural deficiencies based on her lack of standing, th6 motion is merely designed to preempt Ronald Richards, as Special Litigation Counse7 from conducting the tasks this Court has ordered Mr. Richards to perform. The motio8 should be denied based on the various procedural and substantive grounds articulate9 below. 10 LEGAL DISCUSSION 11 I. Ms. Girardi Lacks Standing to Seek the Relief She Is Requesting. 12 Ms. Girardi’s motion is a disguised motion for disqualification of Mr. Richards. B13 “a moving party must have standing, that is, an invasion of a legally cognizable interes14 to disqualify an attorney.” In re Marriage of Murchison, 245 Cal.App.4th 847, 852 (201615 To satisfy the “irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing under Article III, 16 party must establish three elements: (1) a concrete and particularized injury in-fact that i17 actual or imminent; (2) a fairly traceable causal connection between the injury and th18 defendant’s challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed b19 a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see id. 20 560-561. Ms. Girardi cannot satisfy this three-layered test. Her “only demonstrabl21 interest in the order is as a potential party defendant in an adversary proceeding. As suc22 she is not a ‘person aggrieved’ by [Mr. Richards’] appointment.” Matter of Fondiller, 7023 F.2d 441, 442-443 (9th Cir. 1983) (dismissing appeal by debtor’s wife challenging th24 appointment of “special counsel for the specific purpose of continuing to investigate an25 attempting to recover any assets concealed or fraudulently conveyed”). 26 The standing requirement protects against the strategic exploitation of the rules 27 ethics long disfavored by the Courts. See Optyl Eyewear Fashion International v. Styl28 Companies, 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The cost and inconvenience to client

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2 Because of this potential for abuse, disqualification motions should be subjected t3 ‘particularly strict judicial scrutiny’”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Ms. Girardi’s motio4 should be summarily denied based on her lack of standing. 5 II. Alternatively, Ms. Girardi’s Reconsideration Motion Should Be Denie 6 Because It Is Based on the False Premise That Mr. Richards Should B 7 Bound by a Gag Order. 8 A. The requested gag order would be unconstitutional. 9 Although this Court previously refused to issue a gag order against Mr. Richard10 (Joyce Decl., Ex. A, p. 6), Ms. Girardi is asking this Court to (1) silence Mr. Richard11 prospectively by issuing a gag order and (2) to punish Mr. Richards by removing him fro12 this case for exercising his free speech rights in twitting about this case in the past. M13 Girardi’s requests are both flawed. 14 It is a bedrock principle of First Amendment jurisprudence that prior restraints o15 pretrial publicity “are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on Fir16 Amendment rights” which have historically been viewed as “presumptivel17 unconstitutional.” Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558-59 (1976). “Gag order18 on trial participants are unconstitutional unless (1) the speech sought to be restraine19 poses a clear and present danger or serious and imminent threat to a protected competin20 interest; (2) the order is narrowly tailored to protect that interest; and (3) no less restrictiv21 alternatives are available.” Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 84 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1241 (2000). 22 While Ms. Girardi has argued that she has a protected competing interest in havin23 a fair trial, she has not satisfied her evidentiary burden under this test. “Where a part24 contends his or her right to a fair trial has been or will be compromised by pretrial publicit25 the law has long imposed on that party the burden of producing evidence to establish th26 prejudice.” Hurvitz, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at 1242. It “is not enough” to decide “that th27 fair trial right may be affected by the exercise of free speech.” Ibid. (emphasis in original28 Ms. Girardi does not even attempt to present evidence to prove that the comment

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2 merely speculates that the mere risk of such bias could lead to an unfair trial, cas3 authorities “demonstrate that pre-trial publicity – even pervasive, adverse publicity – doe4 not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.” Neb. Press Ass'n, supra, 427 U.S. at 554. Even i5 criminal cases where one’s liberty is at stake, the remedy sought by Ms. Girardi i6 generally unavailable. Because the case law does not “stand for the proposition that juro7 exposure to information about a state defendant’s prior convictions or to news account8 of the crime with which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of du9 process,” id. at 565, it follows a fortiori that this civil dispute does not trigger the extrem10 remedy sought by Ms. Girardi; i.e., a gag order. 11 But even if Ms. Girardi could theoretically establish the inevitability of an unfair tria12 she has failed to show that alternatives to a wholesale gag order would be insufficien13 Notwithstanding her request for a blanket ban against any form of speech over such 14 matter of intense public interest – based on the false premise that fair trials and fre15 speech by lawyers are mutually exclusive – less restrictive alternatives to content-base16 suppression of truthful speech protect litigants from unfair trials. 17 For example, to the extent Ms. Girardi is concerned about potential juror18 perception of her, “a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the cas19 would disable them from rendering an impartial verdict.” Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superi20 Court, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986). Using the many tools at its disposal, the court can insulat21 Ms. Girardi’s trial (assuming there is one) from pretrial publicity by ensuring, throug22 questionnaires and searching voir dire, that individuals selected for the jury lac23 knowledge of, or interest in, the pre-trial publicity. See Connors v. United States, 158 U. 24 408, 413 (1895) (voir dire may be used “to ascertain whether the juror has any bia25 opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair determination by him of the issue26 to be tried”). By contrast, Ms. Girardi’s speculation that the Court will be incapable 27 detecting perjury designed to conceal a juror’s bias contradicts the longstanding respe28 for the expertise of trial courts in matters of jury selection. “Particularly with respect t

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2 v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991). Furthermore, “the almost invariabl3 assumption of the law [is] that jurors follow their instructions,” Richardson v. Marsh, 48 4 U.S. 200, 206 (1987), even when they are exposed to prejudicial information with a fa5 greater psychological impact than Twitter communications or press reports. 6 In addition, the significant temporal gap between the comments attributed to M 7 Richards and the timing of any potential trial further eliminates Ms. Girardi’s claim 8 prejudice. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952) (sustaining the fairness 9 a capital trial because six weeks was a sufficient time to dissipate any potential prejudic10 from the prosecution’s public disclosure of the defendant’s incriminating confession11 Finally, the population of major metropolitan areas – e.g., Los Angeles – is sufficientl12 large, diverse, and transient that appropriate screening techniques such a13 questionnaires and voir dire examination can produce an impartial jury. “Given this larg14 diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not b15 empaneled is hard to sustain.” Skilling v. U.S., 561 U.S. 358, 382 (2010). Otherwise, Fir16 Amendment protections would be illusory if every conceivable threat of diluting th17 currently-unascertainable jury pool, however remote or speculative, were sufficient t18 justify a blanket restriction on speech. 19 In sum, “[p]rior restraints are the most drastic, but not necessarily the mo20 effective, judicial tool for enforcing the right to a fair trial.” Bailey v. Systems Innovatio21 Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding First Amendment violation where litigant22 were precluded from discussing their case with the press). As such, Ms. Girardi’s motio23 should be denied on the merits.1 24 B. The case law invoked by Ms. Girardi does not apply here. 25 Ms. Girardi cites Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) to support he26 position that Mr. Richards should be silenced. Her argument is totally flawed. 27 1 As a public figure, Ms. Girardi’s dislike of publicity is particularly ironic. “Without publicit28 all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of sma

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2 challenged a state bar rule that forbade extrajudicial communications by attorneys th3 would have a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. 4 Gentile, at 510 U.S. at 1034. Deeming the state bar rule to be constitutional, the Cou5 reasoned that “it imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers’ speech,” i6 at 1075, noting it was sufficiently tailored to achieve its objective. The restriction applie7 “only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutr8 as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; an9 it merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the trial.” Id. at 1076. Under thos10 facts, the Court deemed the state bar rule to be constitutional. 11 Here, by contrast, adoption of a categorical ban against public comments by 12 court-appointed advocate would not pass muster under Gentile’s constitutional analysi13 Such a ban, targeted only at Special Litigation Counsel as sought by Ms. Girardi, is neithe14 narrowly tailored to accomplish its goal nor neutral as to point of view. By definition, 15 blanket ban against discussion of Ms. Girardi’s potential involvement does not identif16 discrete statements by counsel that are uniquely likely to harm the right to a fair an17 impartial jury trial. Moreover, a public statement to the media by court-appointed couns18 would be potentially problematic only if there is a high likelihood that it would actuall19 interfere with a fair trial or the due administration of justice. On the other hand, th20 categorical ban espoused by Ms. Girardi fails to exclude from its coverage other forms 21 constitutionally-protected speech, including basic discussion or reference to publi22 records of the court. To the extent Ms. Girardi assumes that an attorney may be silence23 based on a reasonable likelihood that potential jurors may be influenced by the attorney’24 comments to the media, adoption of such a low threshold is constitutionally deficient fo25 the regulation of attorney speech. Statements by attorneys to the media are full26 protected unless, at a minimum, there is a demonstrated, substantial likelihood–not 27 mere possibility or conjecture–of such interference. 28 Ms. Girardi’s motion also seems to conflate the role assigned to Mr. Richards b

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2 be neutral throughout the entire proceedings, Mr. Richards was appointed with th3 understanding that he would be acting as an advocate on behalf of the trustee—e.g., b4 identifying and pursuing potentially responsible parties who may have improperl5 received funds belonging to the estate. As discussed in detail in the supportin6 declaration of Erin Joyce, an ethics expert, the media communications that are the subje7 of Ms. Girardi’s complaint pose no ethical or legal obstacle to Mr. Richards’ continue8 service. (See Joyce Declaration, ¶¶ 6, 15-16, 20, 30-31.) 9 To be sure, court-appointed special litigation counsel should keep an open min10 as to the identity or the involvement of all potential targets but such lawyers are not subje11 to challenge every time a potential target dislikes the additional scrutiny received from th12 court-appointed counsel. Otherwise, the entire statutory mechanism for the appointme13 of special counsel under section 327(e) would cease to operate if a particular target coul14 seek disqualification of the court-appointed attorney based on public comments mad15 that may or may not implicate a particular target. Just as the institutional press has a16 important interest in bringing wrongdoing to light, the role of a court-appointed advocat17 in fearlessly seeking to discuss or identify potential wrongdoing is equally vital and equall18 in need of protection from chilling. 19 III. Ms. Girardi’s Motion Is Procedurally Flawed. 20 A. The applicable standards 21 “A motion for reconsideration [is] not recognized by the Federal Rules of Civ22 Procedure.” Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 312 F.3d 12923 1296, fn. 3 (10th Cir. 2002). “Such a motion is construed in one of two ways: If the motio24 is filed within 28 days after the district court’s entry of judgment, it is treated as a motio25 to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). If the motion is filed more than 28 day26 after entry of judgment, it is considered a motion seeking relief from the judgment unde27 Rule 60(b).” Jones, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Federal Civil Trials & Evidence (Rutte28 Group 2020) ¶¶ 20:273-20:273.2 (citations omitted).

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2 after the June 10 decision by this Court, it is treated as a motion to alter or amend th3 judgment. However, a motion to alter or amend a judgment “may not be used to relitigat4 old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prio5 to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485, n.5 (2008) (intern6 quotes omitted). In particular, a “Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise argument7 or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlie8 in the litigation.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Ci9 2000) (internal citation omitted). After all, reconsideration is “an ‘extraordinary remedy, t10 be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’11 Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). 12 B. The motion violates the governing standards. 13 In order to seek reconsideration under Rule 59(e), Ms. Girardi must show that “(114 the [trial] court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the [trial] court committe15 clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is a16 intervening change in controlling law.” SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.317 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). Because Ms. Girardi does not invoke the second and thir18 grounds, her only possible ground for reconsideration is the claim that she has recentl19 discovered new evidence. 20 However, contrary to her approach, a party cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion t21 introduce new evidence that could have been adduced prior to rendition of the decisio22 being challenged. “[T]he assessment of newness turns on the date of the court’23 dispositive order, not on the date when the motions or briefs are filed.” Hecker v. Deer24 & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 590 (7th Cir. 2009). While Ms. Girardi claims that she did not hav25 the information forming the basis of her new motion when she opposed the trustee’26 request to appoint Mr. Richards, this assertion is factually flawed. For example, M27 Girardi relies on tweets from June 3 and June 9 (prior to the June 10 hearing) to see28 reconsideration. Motion, pp. 13-14. Because these publicly-available tweets preceded th

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2 LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2012) (movant had not shown du3 diligence to discover the evidence where it had been publicly available); Crowell 4 Campbell Soup Co., 264 F.3d 756, 764-765 (8th Cir. 2001) (no abuse its discretion i5 denying Rule 59(e) motion based on newly-discovered evidence where such evidenc6 came from public records). 7 To the extent Ms. Girardi moves under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civ 8 Procedure, made applicable to this case by Rule 9024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptc 9 Procedure, this alternative theory is equally flawed. Rule 60(b)(1) allows limited relief b10 relieving a party from an order based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusabl11 neglect.” In addition, rule 60(b)(2) allows relief based on “newly discovered evidence tha12 with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new tri13 under Rule 59(b).” “None of these potential grounds for relief is applicable here.” Scho14 Dist. No. 1J v. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). “Rule 60(b) relief i15 extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” ClearOn16 Communications, Inc. v. Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 754 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Sellers 17 Mineta, 350 F.3d 706, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (same). 2 18 In any event, whether this Court can correct an alleged substantive mistake unde19 rule 60(b)(1) is certainly questionable. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 891 (120 Cir. 1997) (“wrongly deciding a point of law is not a ‘mistake’ as we have defined that ter21 under Rule 60(b)(1)” under prior circuit cases). The other ground invoked by Ms. Girard22 based on rule 60(b)(2), is similarly inapplicable. See Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., supr23 617 F.3d at 1100-1101 (rejecting “excusable neglect” argument where new evidence wa24 previously available to the defendants, and their proffered reasons for the delay i25 26 2 While rule 60(b) includes other provisions for relief, Ms. Giradi has invoked only rul27 60(b)(1), Motion for Reconsideration, p. 14, fn. 6, in addition to discussing so-callenewly-discovered evidence in her motion, id. at pp. 14-15. The latter argument would fa28 under rule 60(b)(2). Accordingly, the other prongs for relief under rule 60(b) are waive

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2 v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that new evidenc3 “must be of such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been likely to chang4 the disposition of the case”); M.G. v. St. Lucie County School Bd., 741 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (in lawsuit against school board based on the sexual assau6 of plaintiff’s minor child by another student, newly-discovered evidence based on lette7 and police reports regarding other sexual assaults occurring on school grounds did n8 warrant relief under rule 60(b); plaintiff failed to demonstrate the new evidence wa9 unavailable earlier with reasonable diligence). The motion should be denied on thes10 additional grounds. 11 C. The statutory provisions invoked by Ms. Girardi do not apply here. 12 Ms. Girardi’s remaining arguments are equally meritless. For example, she claim13 that Mr. Richards engaged in “disrespectful” and prejudicial conduct by commenting o14 this case. (Motion, 17: 2.) Without bothering to identify a single comment that she deem15 to be disrespectful, she cites Exhibit 1 attached to her motion, a compilation of dozens 16 tweets purportedly exchanged by Mr. Richards and members of the public, claiming th17 Mr. Richards was disrespectful to her and her counsel. (Id.) Setting aside the fact that a18 of the tweets attached are simply inadmissible from a purely evidentiary standpoint (se19 Evidentiary Objections, filed concurrently herewith), Ms. Girardi’s argument that th20 tweets violate the statutory requirement to “maintain the respect due to the courts 21 justice and judicial officers,” Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068(b), is legally and factually flawe22 This statute seeks to ensure respect to the court; it was not designed for litigant23 particularly public figures such as Ms. Girardi that use the media for publicity, to complai24 about adverse publicity. See Martinez v. State of Calif., 238 Cal.App.4th 559, 568-5625 (2015) (attorney refused to heed court’s rulings by repeatedly asking same imprope26 questions, almost “daring the trial judge to take some action to stop her” in violation 27 this statutory language). To the extent Ms. Girardi suggests that Special Litigatio28 Counsel was somehow disrespectful to her former counsel, Peter Mastan, this suggestio

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2 the concurrently-filed Evidentiary Objections. In any event, because Mr. Mastan no longe3 represents Ms. Girardi, this is a moot issue. In addition, as discussed in the concurrently4 filed declaration of Mr. Richards, he has had numerous productive and mutually5 respectful discussions with Ms. Girardi’s current counsel, Evan Borges, based on thei6 ability to work together productively and efficiently in handling these proceedings. 7 Ms. Girardi also claims that Mr. Richards was improperly hostile to her in his tweet8 in violation of section 6068(f). Under this statutory provision, attorneys may not “advanc9 [a] fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by th10 justice of the cause with which he or she is charged.” Judging by this language, this rul11 makes it “improper to use cross-examination solely for the purpose of degrading o12 harassing a witness and prejudicing the jury.” Tuft, et al., Cal. Practice Guid13 Professional Responsibility (Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 8:462. Because the tweets at issue14 were not communicated during Ms. Girardi’s cross-examination, the rule has n15 application here. But even if this rule somehow applied here, Ms. Girardi does not eve16 bother to submit a declaration to substantiate her suggestion that the inadmissible tweet17 she has attached to her motion contained false information in the first place. In additio18 there was never any request by her former counsel (Peter Mastan) or her current couns19 (Evan Borges) to remove or modify any post due to any perceived inaccuracy, thereb20 calling into serious doubt their current assertion that the tweets were false or inaccurat21 In fact, neither of her attorneys asked Mr. Richards for a retraction of any of the tweet22 and neither attorney met and conferred with Mr. Richards before filing this reconsideratio23 motion. 24 As for Ms. Girardi’s claim that the tweets violate subdivision (g) of this section 60625 – which makes it improper “to encourage either the commencement or the continuanc26 of an action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest” – this argume27 is also flawed. Motion, 17:1. This rule applies where an attorney uses judicial proceeding28 based on spite. See Sorensen v. State Bar, 52 Cal.3d 1036, 1043 (1991) (in response t

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2 municipal court action, forcing court reporter to incur substantial legal fees based o3 spite). As such, the rule has no application here. While Ms. Girardi may not like th4 contents of the disputed tweets, she cannot use this rule to silence Mr. Richards. 5 D. Mr. Richards was not required to discuss an un-aired televisio6 interview in his prior disclosures. 7 Ms. Girardi also argues that reconsideration is justified because Mr. Richards wa8 required to notify the Court that he was interviewed in connection with an AB9 documentary “about Girardi Keese, Mr. Girardi and Ms. Girardi, which also feature10 petitioning creditor Kimberly Archie.” Motion, 20: 24-25. While Ms. Girardi invokes Feder11 Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2014, that rule does not support her position.3 12 Ms. Girardi’s view is flawed because she fails to take into account the relevanc13 limitation imposed on the scope of disclosures. See In re Black and White Cab Co., Inc14 175 B.R. 24, 27 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994) (no duty to disclose under 327(e) each and ever15 prior representation of the debtor where “prior representation has no relation to the speci16 matter for which representation is sought”). 17 Ms. Girardi’s reliance on three cases involving disgorgement of fees in othe18 contexts, to support her argument about the scope of disclosure obligations, is totall19 misplaced. Motion, 20. The issue presented here is whether, as special litigation counse20 Mr. Richards is biased or conflicted in investigating and pursuing third parties that ma21 be potentially liable to the estate so as to trigger particular disclosure obligations. Th22 decision in In re Fondiller, 15 B.R. 890, 892-893 (9th Cir. BAP 1981), appeal dismisse23 707 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1983) illustrates the flaw in Ms. Girardi’s argument. 24 In that case, the court held that a law firm that currently represented creditors (b25 26 3 In relevant part, rule 2014 requires the disclosure of the following in the application fo27 appointment of counsel: “all of the person’s connections with the debtor, creditors, another party in interest …. The application shall be accompanied by a verified stateme28 of the person to be employed setting forth the person’s connections with the debto

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2 the bankruptcy judge’s decision to appoint the law firm as “special counsel for the specifi3 purpose of continuing to investigate and attempting to recover the assets concealed o4 fraudulently conveyed.” Fondiller, 15 B.R. at 891. The court reasoned that the law affir5 “qualifies as a ‘disinterested’ entity because it is not included in the categories of person6 that are defined as ‘not disinterested’ by” section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 89 7 Applying the same reasoning here, Mr. Richards is a “disinterested person” because h8 “(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider; (B) is not and was not, withi9 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of th10 debtor; and (C) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estat11 or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or indire12 relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor, or for any other reason.” 113 U.S.C. § 101(14). Because he is disinterested under the governing statutory definitio14 Mr. Richards had no further disclosure obligations regarding his television interview (on15 that never aired). 16 Finally, whether there is a requirement to be disinterested—particularly in relatio17 to a non-creditor/debtor—is certainly debatable. The statutory provision governing th18 appointment of special counsel does not impose a requirement to be disinterested. Whil19 section 327(e) has no such requirement, section 327(a) does.4 Because Mr. Richard20 appointment falls under subdivision (e) as he was hired for a “specified special purpose,21 he need not be disinterested, but need only meet the “no adverse interest” requireme22 23 4 Under subdivision (e), “[t]he trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ, for 24 specified special purpose, other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, aattorney that has represented the debtor, if in the best interest of the estate, and if suc25 attorney does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estatwith respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed.” By contras26 subdivision (a) states as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, th27 trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountantappraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent a28 interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assi

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2 312 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (appointing special counsel to collect the debtor’s accou3 receivables and pursue a lawsuit against a creditor, all of which would accrue to th4 attorney’s own benefit based on his prepetition claim against the debtor secured by 5 security interest in the debtor’s accounts receivable). In the absence of any evidence th 6 Mr. Richards has an adverse interest, Ms. Girardi’s motion should be denied. 7 E. The uncontroverted evidence shows there is no conflict. 8 First, as stated in the Declaration of Ronald Richards, there was no attempt 9 anytime to meet and confer about any alleged inaccurate statements of Ronald Richard10 He does not know Kimberly Archie. He has no legal relationship with her. There was n11 a single piece of evidence in the moving papers that attributed any inaccurate stateme12 to Mr. Richards. The declaration of Elissa Miller (Doc. No. 496, p. 18) and of Ronal13 Richards lay out the extreme prejudice to interfere with her choice of counsel. One cann14 litigate a motion by hiding behind one’s attorney who only presents inadmissible evidenc15 The opposition papers of the Trustee and Mr. Richards present uncontroverted evidenc16 of no conflict. The Trustee specifically said in her declaration in paragraph 5 that “[t]h17 current special litigation counsel is my choice of counsel. It would be prejudicial for m18 to waste valuable time looking for new counsel.” In paragraph 6 she states that “M19 Richards has worked tirelessly and with the tenacity I expected when I retained him. Th20 Estate is well-served by his representation to investigate this target, Erika Girardi.” 21 The only real right at stake in this motion is the Trustee’s choice of counsel an22 Mr. Richards’ right to work as an attorney. It would be miscarriage of justice to allow th23 target of this investigation to shatter that bond he has with his client, the Trustee. 24 Finally, Mr. Richards’ declaration outlines an undisputed professional relationshi25 with Ms. Girardi’s current counsel. Without waiving settlement calls content and othe26 attorney-to-attorney calls, Mr. Richards has an OUTSTANDING RELATIONSHIP with M27 Girardi’s attorney and although they may not agree on all the issues, the one thing that i28 certain, had they met and conferred prior to the filing of this motion, this motion woul

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2 case can move forward to a conclusion, based upon the evidence gathered by M 3 Richards and his hard working team of attorneys on this matter. 4 F. The Court should consider the broader picture in evaluating M 5 Girardi’s true motive in filing this motion. 6 The real motivation behind this motion is Ms. Girardi’s desire to eliminate M 7 Richards as an effective investigator that has aggressively sought to compile th8 necessary financial information needed by the Trustee. Just as an example, Mr. Richard9 has already issued Rule 2004 notices to obtain documentary evidence in order to trac10 the source of funds used by Ms. Girardi to fund her legal expenditures. He had mad11 demands to both her current attorney and prior attorney, most of which preceded thi12 motion, to ascertain the source of payments. This motion’s ulterior motive is to preve13 Mr. Richards, who is close to finding out where her $500,000 plus in legal fee payment14 are coming from, and to track the source of those payments. This is a significant sum 15 money for someone to have to spend in this context. 16 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the attorney-client privilege “does not safeguar17 against the disclosure of either the identity of the fee-payer or the fee arrangement.” Rall18 v. U.S., 52 F.3d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Goodman19 33 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 1994); see also In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Ci20 1983) (“Fee arrangements usually fall outside the scope of the privilege simply becaus21 such information ordinarily reveals no confidential professional communication betwee22 attorney and client, and not because such information may not be incriminating”). 5 I23 addition, Mr. Richards has also sought information regarding Ms. Girardi’s funding of leg24 expenditures incurred by the Rule 2004 witnesses, thereby motivating her to derail thi25 26 5 Other cases are in accord. See In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1975(“Thus it has generally been held that information concerning the fee arrangeme27 between an attorney and his client, or the existence of the attorney-client relationship inot privileged or protected by the attorney-client privilege”); U.S. v. Blackman, 72 F.328 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1995) (“client identity and the nature of the fee arrangement betwee

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2 This case is not much different than narcotics cases where one uses one’s ow3 money to have her OWN attorneys represent the witnesses who have inculpator4 information about her. This paid-for representation by her has cut off the Special Litigatio 5 Counsel’s access to those witnesses and has dramatically increased the cost and burde6 to get documents from her accountant and divorce attorney, none of which have bee7 provided as of yet. If this were criminal court, Ms. Girardi’s counsel would be disqualifie 8 It is unclear if he can represent HARRIS GINSBERG LLP’S, the family law firm, as we9 as ULLMAN ACCOUNTANCY CORP’S, the CPA, and Larry Ginsberg individually, as we10 as Michael Ullman individually, and of course, Erika Girardi. At some point, this raise11 major red flags regarding the independence of her counsel. 12 Against this backdrop, Ms. Girardi’s current motion should be denied, given he13 ulterior motives in shutting down the financial investigations. 14 CONCLUSION 15 The motion should be summarily denied. 16 Dated: July 16, 2021 Respectfully submitted, 17 LAW OFFICES OF RONALD RICHARDS & 18 ASSOCIATES, APC 19 WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ 20 EDELMAN & DICKER LLP 21 By: /s/ Ronald Richards 22 Ronald Richards Robert Cooper 23 24 25 26 27 28

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